• Facebook
• X
• Threads
• Reddit

A single three-storey building serves all 1,500 students at Mabuhay City Elementary School in Dasmariñas, Cavite. To accommodate everyone, the school runs on three shifts, with 500 students each shift, crowded into 13 classrooms that can barely fit the 40 or so pupils crammed into them for four hours each day. 

Yet, just steps away, another three-storey school building has stood idle, empty, and unfinished for nearly two years. 

Funded through the Basic Education Facilities Fund (BEFF), the government’s annual school construction budget, the P32-million project was contracted to Quezon-based L.A. Clamor Construction.

The Cavite 3rd District Engineering Office of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) said the contractor needed to do extensive structural work because the building site, near a waterway,  required adjustments to the usual school building design. The contractor met the revised scope of work, they said, but the building needs additional funding so it can be completed.

But the project was put on hold, said School Head Ramon Novicio, because the request for additional funding was made for a four-storey building, when the actual building was only three stories. Because of that error, the project has been stuck in bureaucratic limbo. 

The Mabuhay school is emblematic of the problems hobbling the government’s school infrastructure program. Following the flood control scandal last year, President Marcos canceled the flood-control budget and transferred  a big chunk of it to education. As much as P80 billion was allocated to the 2026 school infrastructure budget.

But that brings little comfort for the students and faculty of the Mabuhay school. “No matter how intelligent and effective teachers are in delivering instruction, some learners will encounter difficulties in absorbing their lessons as long as their classrooms are overcrowded,” said Novicio.

Mabuhay is hardly an isolated case. In 2025, Education Secretary Sonny Angara said around 1,000 DPWH-built classrooms were unusable. In addition, 166,000 classrooms have yet to be built. 

This year’s school infrastructure budget is the biggest in eight years. In the past, poor planning and faulty and fraudulent procurement have derailed the government’s school building program. Can the two government departments—education and public works—deliver this time? And will school infrastructure projects be immune to the anomalies that have long dogged public works?

PCIJ analyzed more than 30,000 school infrastructure contracts awarded by the DPWH from 2016 to 2026.  Our findings show that the problems that hounded flood-control projects were evident in school projects as well. These include: 

• Projects that were awarded to politically well-connected  contractors with a history of graft and substandard construction;
• Lobbying by legislators and other officials, which influenced what projects were funded, favoring some areas despite the need to distribute projects equitably across the country; and
• Bureaucratic red tape and delays in the identification of projects, which resulted in huge backlogs in project implementation.

The government has taken measures to limit fraud and corruption, including assigning projects to local governments and DPWH regional, rather than district, engineering offices, which were the hub of corruption in flood-control projects. Cases have been filed against erring contractors, some of whom have lost their licenses and been banned from public works projects.

Still, skeptics ask: Does the government have the administrative capacity to solve the classroom shortage? With P400 billion needed to address the backlog, can it deliver quality school buildings on time and ensure that taxpayers’ money is not lost to corruption?

Here are our findings:

1. In the past 10 years, the Discaya and Co families reaped billions from school infra contracts

Most school construction funds are lodged with the DepEd, while the DPWH oversees procurement and implementation. Data from the DPWH Transparency Portal reveals that contractors tied to the flood control scandal were the same ones awarded a large share of school infrastructure contracts.

Construction tycoons Curlee and Sarah Discaya bagged some P13.4 billion worth of school building and facility contracts from 2016 to 2026–the largest haul among all contractors.

Under Duterte’s watch, two Discaya firms dominated school infrastructure projects: Alpha & Omega with P5.6 billion and St. Timothy with P4.2 billion, making them the previous administration’s top two school infrastructure contractors.

With multiple graft and malversation charges over alleged irregularities in their Davao Occidental and Bulacan flood control projects, nine Discaya companies have had their licenses revoked by the Philippine Contractors Accreditation Board. 

DPWH records show the couple secured P232 million in school contracts from the Bulacan 1st District Engineering Office since 2019. Brice Hernandez, a former engineer for that district, said during a Senate Blue Ribbon Committee hearing that all projects in his area, including classrooms, were overpriced or “underdesigned,” meaning they were of substandard quality. 

He revealed that only 30% to 50% of the contract cost was actually spent on public work projects in his district. For vertical structures like school buildings, however, kickbacks for proponents were limited to 10% because any more than that would make these buildings structurally unsound, posing dangers to those using them. 

The chart below shows the engineering districts that had the biggest school contracts with Discaya companies.

During the same 10-year period, Hi-Tone Construction and Development Corp. and Sunwest Inc., founded by brothers and former lawmakers Cristopher Co and Zaldy Co, secured P1.6 billion worth of contracts. Most of these were awarded in Albay, their home turf.

While these firms already landed school contracts in previous administrations, Hi-Tone rose to No. 2 among school contractors while Zaldy Co chaired the House appropriations committee during the first half of the Marcos presidency.

Co fled the country after the flood control exposé and currently faces multiple graft and malversation cases related to his projects in Oriental Mindoro and Bulacan.

2. Several contractors won big contracts, even if they performed badly in their past projects.

Over half of the top 15 school infrastructure contractors in the Duterte era received at least one poor (less than 75%) or unsatisfactory (75-82%) rating, based on the Constructors’ Performance Evaluation System (CPES). By contrast, only two of Marcos’s top 15 contractors received such ratings.

Three firms were flagged for their especially poor performance in school building projects: C.T. Leoncio Trading and Construction (No. 12 , Duterte, No.  8, Marcos), R. Semilla Construction (No. 14, Duterte) and Genetian Builders and Enterprises Inc. (No. 7, Duterte). 

CPES serves as contractors’ “report card.” Although all constructors in top 15 obtained favorable marks in majority of their projects, at least one poor or unsatisfactory score arising from their negligence should bar them from taking on any government projects, according to Section 4.2 (f) of the Government Procurement Policy Board’s Guidelines for Blacklisting of Constructors.

Blacklisted firms face a one-year penalty, unless the blacklisting agency requests to extend it for justifiable reasons. In some cases, contractors can face perpetual disqualification, similar to Syms Construction and Trading (No. 5, Marcos), whose owner admitted lending her license to DPWH officials in exchange for a 3% royalty fee in all projects. 

Performance ratings tell only part of the story. Besides Discayas and Co, others have also faced allegations of graft, corruption and other violations. Explore the table for details on their reported cases.

3. Questionable budget items bankrolled some school infrastructure projects linked to favored officials like Ralph Recto. 

BEFF is only one of several funding sources for school structures. DPWH also delivers school building projects through various budget streams, including the Convergence and Special Support Program (CSSP) and unprogrammed appropriations (UAs). Both, however, have drawn scrutiny in the wake of the flood control scandal.

UAs are meant to give the government a ready pool of funds when extra revenues become available. But in the 19th Congress, they served as a vehicle for lawmakers’ project insertions or financial subsidies to their constituents, said AJ Montesa of Peoples’ Budget Coalition.

“The fact that they placed them [projects] under UA is a signal that it was not really a priority or part of the budget. They were willing to risk the projects not being implemented properly. That is a major red flag,” said Montesa.

Unprogrammed funds largely flowed to flood control, but they also supported some school infrastructure projects. PCIJ found that DPWH awarded P934 million in UA-funded school contracts from 2023 to 2024. Nearly half of that amount (P412 million) went to only six projects in Lipa City, Batangas, the home turf of Executive Secretary Ralph Recto.

In 2024, when he was finance secretary, Recto directed the turnover of excess Philhealth funds to the national treasury for use under UAs. Facing criticism, Recto defended his order, saying the 2024 budget’s special provisions authorized it. Recto was Lipa’s representative when Congress passed the 2024 national budget. 

The Supreme Court struck down the transfer as unconstitutional in December 2025, but cleared Recto of criminal liability over the fund diversion. PCIJ sought comment from the executive secretary, but he has yet to respond. 

Besides UAs, a much larger budget pool for school infra comes through CSSP. This covers DPWH projects tied to other agencies’ programs and range from classrooms and access roads leading to airports, trading hubs and tourist sites.

Some P21 billion in school infrastructure contracts were awarded under CSSP during the Marcos administration. In the last three years, just five district and regional engineering offices received nearly a third of CSSP’s budget: Metro Manila 1st (P1.8 billion), Bulacan 1st (P1.3 billion), Metro Manila 3rd (P1.3 billion), Batangas 4th (P1.3 billion) and Region 1 (P820 million)

Senator Panfilo Lacson pointed out that in recent years, funding for CSSP has ballooned from the executive branch’s budget proposal to its final version because of insertions by legislators. Former DPWH Secretary Rogelio Singson claimed that many CSSP projects were poorly planned.

In DPWH’s proposed 2027 budget, all convergence programs have been dropped to avoid potential duplication of projects. The Basic Infrastructure Program–a sub-component of CSSP, will remain, but projects below P5 million will be excluded.

4. Planning and procurement woes have derailed the school building program

Despite billions poured into school infrastructure each year, classrooms and facilities often took more than two years to be built. 

Site ownership disputes, limited buildable spaces, procurement delays, design changes, failed bids and canceled contracts all pose setbacks to the school building program, according to the Second Congressional Commission on Education (EDCOM2).

But for ACT Teachers Rep. Antonio Tinio, the budget process, which he says remains shaped by the pork barrel system, is depriving students and teachers of classrooms and facilities they urgently need.

“Dapat may listahan na ng classroom sa NEP pa lang. Ibig sabihin nun, validated and completed na yung requirements so pwede nang magsimula ng construction January pa lang,” he said. 

But this is not the case as recipient schools are finalized and validated only after the DPWH and DepEd sign a memorandum of agreement, according to DPWH Secretary Vince Dizon. By then, much of the year has already passed, leaving contracts to be put out to bid only around October or November.

Each source of delay is costly as demand for classrooms continues to grow. EDCOM 2 warned the backlog could balloon to 219,000 in 2028. Even now, overcrowded classrooms make it harder for teachers to attend to pupils’ individual needs, said Benjo Basas of Teachers’ Dignity Coalition.

“Some teachers handle around 50 students in one classroom, and each student has different needs and backgrounds,” said Basas. “We have to attend to each student—monitor their development and check on their well-being. Otherwise, there may be red flags in a student’s behavior that teachers might miss.”

Are local governments ready to help in the school building program?

To ease classroom congestion, DepEd has called on local government units (LGUs) to take a bigger role in building new learning spaces. LGUs can either hire a contractor (Construction by Contract) or carry out projects using their own staff and resources (Construction by Administration).

But tapping LGUs does not automatically clear the hurdles that have long plagued the school building program. 

In 2022, the Manila city government promised Ramon Magsaysay High School (RMHS) a new building. But four years on, students and teachers are still holding classes in borrowed spaces, having moved across three campuses since the demolition.

The schools they relocated struggled to absorb Ramon Magsaysay’s large student population, said teacher Christian George Eppie. Power outages sometimes forced classes online. Then, come summer, tightly packed classrooms trapped heat and let noise bleed from the corridors.

The project’s first phase, worth P1.4 billion, was awarded to a joint venture involving Discaya-owned St. Timothy Construction. It was due to finish in 2024 but was accomplished only in late 2025, according to the Manila LGU, which blamed demolition and relocation issues, design revisions, and typhoons for the delay.

A different contractor is handling the second phase, with the building expected to open in February 2027. Until then, RMHS continues to share space at the newly built Dr. Alejandro Albert Elementary School, where Eppie said conditions are better. Still, the delay has meant that an entire batch of students has gone through junior high school without a building of its own.

“We are grateful to the schools that accommodated us dahil patuloy naming nairaos yung face-to-face classes. Pero yung mga naranasan naming problems, they could have been prevented kung nung 2024, na-turn over na, nagawa na yung building.,” said Eppie.

How then will DepEd ensure LGUs deliver quality classrooms on time? DepEd told PCIJ that LGUs are not left to manage these projects on their own. It retains key planning and oversight under both modes–from identifying beneficiary schools, setting design and technical standards, and approving project plans and modification. 

Aside from local governments, DepEd will also partner with the military, private sector, and civil society organizations to speed up school construction. They also reviewed and digitized school site records to identify available spaces, clearing delays in the planning phase.

DPWH, for its part, is changing how it delivers BEFF projects. Regional offices, rather than district offices, will now implement the contracts. The department has also bundled projects into larger packages to attract bigger contractors, moving away from smaller contracts that were difficult to manage.

Some 2,100 classrooms funded by the 2025 BEFF and previous appropriations have been completed, according to DPWH. The department also committed to begin construction on another 11,000 classrooms this year.

But narrowing the classroom backlog is only half the job. The government, still mired in the fallout from the flood control expose, must also rebuild public trust, said Montesa.

“Last year they tried to rebuild trust by instituting reforms and opening the bicam session. But they have to show more. Dapat mas maging involved pa yung civil society sa paggawa ng budget natin because this will show na trustworthy ulit ang processes and institutions natin,” he said.— PCIJ.org