A documentary on the murder of Doc Gerry Ortega, produced by the PCIJ with support from the Open Society Institute (OSI)

EXACTLY ONE YEAR ago today (January 24), a gunman shot dead Palawan environmentalist and broadcast journalist Doc Gerry Ortega along Puerto Princesa’s busy highway. Ortega was one of Palawan’s most popular radio commentators, anchoring the radio program “Ramatak” on DWAR Radio Mindanao Network.

The alleged gunman, Marlon Recamata, was immediately caught by passing firemen and charged with murder. Recamata was also caught on the local government’s CCTV cameras casing the scene of the crime, and fleeing immediately after Ortega’s murder.

More importantly, Recamata pleaded guilty to the charge of murder, and identified his other co-conspirators, including former marine soldier Rodolfo Edrad, who allegedly coordinated the whole operation. In turn, Edrad turned state witness, and identified former Palawan Governor Joel Reyes and Marinduque Governor Jose Carreon as the masterminds.

Interestingly, the gun was traced to Romeo Serratubias, who had served as provincial administrator for Reyes. Serratubias claimed he had sold the gun to another person. Serratubias only presented a handwritten note as evidence of the sale of the gun.

Despite the trail of evidence and testimonies, the case against the alleged masterminds has barely moved foward.

“We’ve always known that justice here is slow,” said Ortega’s daughter Mika on the first anniversary of her father’s murder. “But this is unbelievably slow. It has been an entire year. This is already ridiculous.”

A special panel of prosecutors had removed the names of Governors Reyes and Carreon from the original charge sheet in June last year, claiming there was insufficient evidence. After an outcry and an appeal from the Ortega family, Justice Secretary Leila de Lima formed another special panel of prosecutors to study the case.

The new panel has reportedly submitted its recommendations to De Lima earlier this month.

“All that is needed is probable cause,” Mika Ortega said. “There is probable cause. Kinakabahan kami kasi hindi namin alam ang laman ng recommendation.”

Edrad also appeared before the Palawan Regional Trial Court today to testify during the murder trial of Recamata. It was the first time that Edrad appeared in court to testify to his involvement in the murder.

Defense counsels objected to the presentation of Edrad as a witness, but the judge allowed Edrad to affirm the veracity of the affidavits he had earlier signed identifying all those allegedly involved in the conspiracy, from Reyes and Carreon to Recamata.

Ortega said Edrad also told the court that his life was in constant danger, especially after agreeing to turn state witness against the alleged masterminds in the case.

As for the Ortega family, family members gathered in Aborlan to commemorate the first death anniversary of Gerry Ortega. The family and close friends are also scheduled to hold a candlelight vigil tonight in memory of the slain broadcaster.

That’s the score of the so-called “Gods of Padre Faura” – the justices of the Supreme Court – as well as those in the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, and all the judges and personnel of the judiciary. Zero in their disclosure of the full details of their statements of assets, liabilities, and net worth or SALN for the last two decades.

Since 1992, the asset records of the judiciary have remained sub rosa or secret on account of a series of self-serving resolutions that the high court under a series of chief justices had issued.

It began when the high court under then chief justice Andres Narvasa first granted virtual rank exemption for all judiciary personnel from compliance with Republic Act No. 6713 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.

The Narvasa court’s decision was affirmed in subsequent resolutions of the chief justices that followed, namely Hilario Davide Jr., Artemio Panganiban, Reynato Puno, and now Renato C. Corona.

As a result, multiple requests for copies of SALNs from the high court and the appellate court that the PCIJ over the years have to this day yielded zero documents.

In 2006, the PCIJ filed a request for the SALNs of the judges and justices, up the level of the Supreme Court, so these could be uploaded on PCIJ’s online database, http://i-site.ph.

The PCIJ, however, never received a formal response from the Supreme Court. It learned that the Court had denied one of its requests only because an enterprising reporter of The Manila Times made a story out of it. The reporter saw a July 2009 PCIJ letter request for SALNs and asked for a specific explanation why the Court could not grant access. The Court told the reporter that by making the SALN public on PCIJ website, the public may use the information against the justices.

On April 27, 2006, the Supreme Court issued a “Media Backgrounder” defining the procedure for “Request of Copies of Statements of Assets and Liabilities of Justices, Judges and Court Personnel.”

The “Media Backgrounder” is still the latest resolution of the high court restricting access to the SALNs not only of magistrates, but also that of all court personnel. It remains in force to this day.

Among other things, it states that there should be “a legitimate reason” for the request, since access to such documents could lead to supposed “fishing expeditions” by litigants and other parties against judiciary personnel.

In the “Backgrounder,” the Court reasoned that such requests could also undermine the independence of justices, and expose them to retaliation for adverse decisions, or even to extortion, kidnapping, and blackmail. The Court added, “In the few areas where there is extortion by rebel elements of where the nature of their work exposes to assaults against their personal safety, the request shall not only be denied but should be immediately reported to the military.”

Interestingly, the guidelines include a provision that says the Court must state “the reason for the denial” of the request – something it failed to do with that of PCIJ.

In 2009, the tribunal informed the PCIJ that the en banc had created a “special committee” to study the consolidated requests of the PCIJ for the SALNs, as well as the personal data sheets and curriculum vitae (PDS/CVs) of the justices.

Chaired by Associate Justice Minita Chico-Nazario until she retired in 2010, neither the committee nor the high court has revealed whatever came of the several hearings that the committee had conducted.

This is even as the PCIJ in October 2009 filed a 19-page pleading with the office of the Court Administrator to submit its views to the committee.

It noted that the duty of public officials to disclose their SALNs is enshrined in Section 17 Article XI & Section 28 Article II of the 1987 Constitution that declares: “Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.”

In the pleading, the PCIJ was represented by three lawyers adept in freedom of information issues: Nepomuceno Malaluan of the Action for Economic Reforms, and Professors Solomon Lumba and Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, at the time the secretary and dean of the University of the Philippines College of Law, respectively.

Aside from records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the pleading cited arguments from the records of the Senate, decisions of the Supreme Court itself, jurisprudence in the United States, and the practice of the US Federal Supreme Court to argue for full and prompt disclosure of the justices’ SALNs.

The PCIJ pleading noted that in several rulings, the Supreme Court itself held that the Constitution clearly guarantees the people’s right to access information and spells out the obligation or duty of public officials to disclose information.

Too, the pleading pointed out that high court rulings have asserted that, “when it comes to the right of the people to information on matters of public concern, the presumption is in favor of access by the public because to hold otherwise ‘will serve to dilute the constitutional right’.”

“Thus, the duty to disclose information should be differentiated from the duty to permit access to information,” the pleading said. “There is no need to demand from the government agency disclosure of information as this is mandatory under the Constitution; failing that, legal remedies are available.”

Culling Constitutional Commission records, the pleading cited this statement by the late Senator and Commissioner Blas F. Ople: “This is a mandate on the State to be accountable by following a policy of full public disclosure. For example, information concerning loans contracted by the government ought to be made available. Public officials should follow this policy by submitting their statements of assets and liabilities and making them available for public scrutiny, not merely storing them in the archives, which is what happens most of the time.”

The pleading argued that, “the principle of independence of the judiciary does not bar disclosure of or access to the SALNs of the justices.

In Duplantier v United States of America, an action challenging the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, the United States Court of Appeals 5th Circuit discussed many, if not all, of the competing interests involved.

The plaintiffs contended that the requirement for judges to file personal financial reports for public disclosure under the Act intrudes upon the independent, decisional freedom of United States judges and thereby violates the constitutional principle of separation of powers.

They further argued that the Act unconstitutionally interferes with judicial independence by subjecting federal judges to familial disquiet, political pressure, and increased threats of physical or economic harm at the hands of criminals and disgruntled litigants.

Some of the Duplantier considerations were also touched upon in the Supreme Court en banc resolution dated May 2, 1989, establishing its policy for the release of SALNs of members of the judiciary.

But the Court also noted that similar requests may not be made upon the justices and judges of the Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan, Court of Tax Appeals, Regional Trial Courts, Shari’a Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts under circumstances that may endanger, diminish or destroy their independence and objectivity in the performance of their judicial functions or expose them to revenge for adverse decisions, kidnapping, extortion, blackmail, or other untoward consequences.

As such, it resolved to lay down guidelines on requests for SALNs of justices, judges, and court personnel, citing that, “the independence of the Judiciary is constitutionally as important as the right to information which is subject to the limitations provided by law. Under specific circumstances, the need for the fair and just adjudication of litigations may require a court to be wary of deceptive requests for information which shall otherwise be freely available.”

The Constitution, however, clearly enrolls the Supreme Court justices among the officials who must, upon assumption of office, and as often as may be required by law, “submit a declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities, and net worth.”

The Charter also stipulates: “In the case of the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional offices, and officers of the armed forces with general or flag rank, the declaration shall be disclosed to the public in the manner provided by law.”

But the PCIJ pleading lamented that “the manner in which the Supreme Court has historically dealt with requests for SALNs of members of the judiciary has not always been consistent with this presumption” of the people’s right to access information.

An en banc resolution dated May 2, 1989 required SALN requesters to state the purpose of the request and outlined the conditions under which requests would be denied.

This resolution was followed by the high court’s resolution in Administrative Matter No.92-9-851–RTC, in which it turned more restrictive. It authorized the Court Administrator “to act on requests for copies of the assets and liabilities, as well as other papers and documents on file with the 201 Personnel Records of lower court judges and personnel, only upon a court subpoena duly signed by the Presiding Judge in a pending criminal case against a judge or personnel, and in the case of the Ombudsman, upon the appropriate request personally signed by the Ombudsman.”

Previous PCIJ requests for SALNs had all met with denials from the high court.
On June 6, 2006, the PCIJ wrote Clerk of Court Ma. Luisa Villarama to get copies of the justices’ SALNs, stating that “the data will be used for the PCIJ’s website on Philippine politics and governance.”

On the same day, Ismael Khan Jr., then Assistant Court Administrator and Chief of the Public Information Office, responded and enclosed a “Media Backgrounder” embodying guidelines governing the procedures for the release of the SALNs.

On August 2, 2006, the PCIJ sent Khan another letter seeking clarification on whether the request has been denied, and if so, to state the reason for the denial. If it had not been denied, the PCIJ wrote, would Khan’s office then kindly inform it of what is lacking in the request?

Five days later, Khan responded, stating that PCIJ had to “fully comply with the guidelines”; and that the Court found that the reason stated was “insufficient and hence would like to be apprised of the specific purpose or purposes for which the SALNs of the SC Justices will be used.”

On August 9, 2006, the PCIJ wrote Khan to offer a more detailed explanation about its information website, but received no response to this.

The pending PCIJ pleading before the high court averred that the wording of the tribunal’s two resolutions and the manner in which these have been interpreted and applied indicate that “whenever there is a request for SALNs of members of the judiciary, it is the burden of the requester to establish the legitimacy of the purpose of his request.”

Even worse, it said, this burden on the requester has been imposed despite “the wide latitude of discretion of the Court or its functionaries to pass upon the legitimacy of said purpose, as can be seen in PCIJ’s experience.”

“The effect is to nullify the presumption in favor of disclosure to or access by the public,” the pleading added.

To this day, nearly 25 years after the 1987 Constitution was ratified with firm guarantees of the people’s right to know, “no one has, as of yet, successfully requested from the Court the SALNs of Justices of the Supreme Court…the presumption is actually against disclosure or access.”

What follows is the paper trail (and pertinent records) of this 20-year fruitless effort to pry open the asset records of the judiciary:

1. PCIJ Memorandum/Pleading, October 2009, A.M. No. 09-8-6-SC RE: Request for Copies of the SALNs and PDS/CVs of the Justices of the Supreme Court.
2. PCIJ Request Letters for SALNs of the Justices (Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan)
   • Letter dated July 17, 2009 addressed to Associate Justice Diosdado M.Peralta, Sandiganbayan
   • Letter dated July 30, 2009 addressed to Hon. Conrado M. Vasquez Jr., Court of Appeals
   • Letter dated July 30, 2009 addressed to Chief Justice Reynato Puno, Supreme Court
   • Letter dated August 11, 2009 addressed to Associate Maria Cristina C.Estrada, Sandiganbayan
   • Sandiganbayan’s reply dated August 14, 2009
   • Letter dated August 13, 2009 addressed to Chief Justice Reynato Puno, Supreme Court
   • Letter dated August 19, 2009 addressed to Chief Justice Reynato Puno, Supreme Court
   • Letter dated December 19, 2012 addressed to Chief Justice Renato Corona, Supreme Court.
3. PCIJ Letters to the Justices of the Supreme Court inquiring about their business interests still listed in their names, as per public records available with the Securities and Exchange Commission:
   • Letter to Bersamin dated May 20, 2010
   • Letter to De Castro dated May 20, 2010
   • Letter to Carpio dated May 19, 2010
   • Letter to Corona dated May 19, 2010
4. Justices’ reply letters to the PCIJ:
   • Abad’s reply dated May 28, 2010
   • Bersamin’s reply dated May 24, 2010
   • Carpio’s reply dated June 3, 2010
   • Corona’s reply dated May 25, 2010
   • Peralta’s reply dated June 9, 2010

– Malou Mangahas, PCIJ, January 2012

The Office of the Secretary General is the repository agency of the SALNs of the members of the House of Representatives as provided in Republic Act No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees) and the Civil Service Commission’s Resolution No. 060231.

Sept. 6, 2010
PCIJ Research Director Karol Ilagan sent a letter to Secretary-General Marilyn B. Yap, requesting for (a) the 2008 and 2009 SALN and PDS/CV of the 14th Congress House members, and (b) 2010 SALN (upon assumption) and PDS/CV of the 15th Congress House members. PCIJ also sent an accomplished Request Form as required by the Secretary General’s office. The request was also made as a follow-up to PCIJ’s previous requests dated October 14, 2009 and May 19, 2010.

Sept. 28, 2010
Ilagan called the Secretary General’s office to follow up on the request. She was told that the letter was forwarded to Legal (office) on Sept. 6.

Jan. 18, 2011
Ilagan called the Secretary General’s office. Ilagan was asked to visit the House of Representatives and meet with Emily, a staff employee at the Office of the Secretary General.

Feb. 10, 2011
Ilagan, along with then PCIJ Senior Researcher Che de los Reyes, visited the Office of the Secretary General upon Emily’s advice that PCIJ talk to a director. Ilagan and de los Reyes spoke with Director Roberto P. Maling who said that he will check with Secretary General Yap on the status of PCIJ’s request. He promised to call the same day. He called at around 7 pm. De los Reyes talked to him. Maling asked PCIJ to send another letter stating a “more specific” reason why it needs the SALNs. He sounded very apologetic. PCIJ’s Sept. 6, 2010 letter indicated that it is requesting the said documents for “purposes of research.”

Feb. 17, 2011
PCIJ sent a revised letter upon Maling’s instruction that a “more specific” reason be cited. In the Feb. 17, 2011 letter signed by Ilagan and PCIJ’s Executive Director Malou Mangahas, PCIJ recounted the requests it had previously made to the Office of the Secretary General. It also said that as an independent media agency, it was requesting for copies of the documents “for research and reporting purposes.” As well, the request was made so PCIJ could update its library files of the SALNs and PDS of government officials and employees. An accomplished Request Form was attached to the letter.

A copy of the letter was furnished to House Speaker Feliciano Belmonte Jr., House Committee on Public Information Chair Rep. Ben Evardone, Civil Service Commission Chairman Francisco Duque, and then Ombudsman Merceditas Gutierrez.

A staff employee of the Civil Service Commission, upon receipt of PCIJ’s Feb. 17, 2011 letter, called Ilagan; the CSC staff said that she would check if CSC has filed of the House members’ SALN.

Feb. 22, 2011
Director Maling of the Office of the Secretary General called and said that PCIJ’s request was being granted. He said that PCIJ should coordinate with Atty. Ricardo Bering of the Records Management Service in order to have the SALNs and CVs photocopied. Ilagan then called Bering to arrange for a meeting the following day. Bering agreed to see Ilagan the next day in the morning.

Feb. 23, 2011
Ilagan and de los Reyes went to the office of Bering, who seemed to act as if he and Ilagan did not talk the previous day. He even had to call Director Maling of the Secretary General’s office. Eventually, Bering approved the release of the 2008 and 2009 SALNs. Ilagan asked about the 2010 SALNs, which was included in the request. Bering said that the 2010 SALNs were not yet available. Ilagan pointed out that the 2010 SALNs referred to in the request refers to the July 2010 or the SALN upon assumption of the House members. Bering said 2010 means “as of December 2010.” Bering made this assertion even if the request was dated Sept. 6, 2010.

Bering asked Ilagan to send another letter-request for the July 2010 or the upon-assumption SALN. Ilagan and de los Reyes arranged for the photocopying of the 2008 and 2009 SALNs at MAA, a photocopying service/station just outside Bering’s office.

Ilagan and de los Reyes then went to Maling’s office to clarify the 2010 SALN request. Maling said that another request should just be made. As for the CVs, he said he would follow this up with Human Resources. He also said that if the 2008 and 2009 CVs were with Records, then these should be provided. Ilagan and de los Reyes went back to Bering and told him what Maling said.

Feb. 24, 2011
PCIJ sent a new request-letter along with the Request Form to Secretary General Yap, following instructions from Bering and Maling.

Feb. 28, 2011
De los Reyes got a text from Tyrone of MAA (photocopying service), saying that the SALNs were ready for pick up. Ilagan then asked a PCIJ intern to go the following day and get the documents.

Mar. 1, 2011
The PCIJ intern went to Records but the documents were not immediately released to her; the documents would be released only to Ilagan. Ilagan phoned Bering, who asked if the intern was authorized to get the documents. He also asked Ilagan to send an authorization letter. Ilagan sent an authorization letter. The intern was then able to get the 2008 and 2009 SALNs upon payment of P4,065. Still pending are the 14th and 15th Congress members’ CV and the July 2010 SALNs and the December 2010 SALNs, which should be available after the April 30 deadline.

Mar. 3, 2011
Ilagan called the Secretary General’s office to make a follow-up. She was told that the letter was still with Legal, where it had been since Feb. 24.

Mar. 9, 2011
Ilagan called the Secretary General’s office to make another follow-up. Emily said that Ilagan should ask Bles of Legal. Ilagan phoned Bles of Legal. Bles said that the request was still being processed. “May process kasi (There is a process),” she said. She added that a response was still being prepared.

Mar. 21, 2011
Ilagan called Legal to make a follow-up. Chona of Legal told Ilagan to call again after lunch because the person concerned had stepped out. Ilagan received mail from Rep. Maximo Rodriguez of Abante Mindanao that contained his July 2010 SALN.

Mar. 24, 2011
Ilagan called Legal to make a follow-up. Bles said the request had already been transferred to the Secretary General’s office. Ilagan then called the Office of the Secretary General. Emily said that Ilagan should talk to Director Maling.

Mar. 28, 2011
Ilagan phoned Director Maling. Maling asked Ilagan to call back because he was still looking for the file.

Mar. 29, 2011
Ilagan called Maling, who said the request was “okay.” He advised Ilagan to call Atty. Bering of Records. Ilagan talked to Hans Cortez of Records. Cortez said he would call back. He did not.

Apr. 4, 2011
Ilagan called Bering of Records. Bering said that there was still “no action taken” on PCIJ’s request. He said the files of the July 2010 SALN were not complete. He insisted that PCIJ should just get the December 2010 SALNs because these should almost be the same with the July 2010 SALNs.

Ilagan then called Emily of the Secretary-General’s office who said that the reply pertaining to the approval of the request was sent to Records on Mar. 15. Ilagan called Cortez of Records. Cortez said that Records did not receive any reply, but that he would check and call back. He did not call back.

Apr. 19, 2011
House of Representatives was closed for the entire week.

Apr. 25, 2011
Ilagan called the Records Management Service. Cortez said he received the Mar. 15 letter. But he said he was told by Bering that only the December 2010 SALNs would be provided because the difference is just months from the upon assumption or July 2010 SALN. Cortez also said that he was just following orders. Ilagan called again to talk to Bering, but he was not available.

Apr. 26, 2011
Ilagan called the Secretary General’s office to clarify things. Jane said the copy of the letter with the signature and approval of Secretary General Yap was already with Records so that’s where PCIJ should coordinate. She said the Office of the Secretary-General had already approved it.

Ilagan then called the Records Management Service. Bering was in a meeting.

Ilagan called again and was able to speak to Bering. According to Bering, it was Maling of the Secretary General’s office who said that only the December 2010 SALNs should be released. Bering said he did not see the letter with Yap’s approval.

Ilagan then called Maling. Maling asked Ilagan to give him until the next Tuesday so he could check what happened; he could then give PCIJ the right response. He said PCIJ was not the only one with a request so the “baka sala-salabat na ang response.” He also said he was not sure anymore because there were many transactions at hand. Still, Maling said that the Speaker might have also given an instruction.

May 4, 2011
Ilagan called Maling who said that he would ask Bering. Maling then called Ilagan and said that the documents would not be released. He said the his office could only issue a summary of the SALNs of the House members. He said the process was “tedious” and “huhugutin bawat isa.” Ilagan told Maling that perhaps Records could keep a separate file for photocopying in order to keep the original files in tact. Maling said that RG Cruz of ABS-CBN also made a request and that he would tell him the same. Ilagan told Maling that she will send another request. Maling said that in the future, the House of Representatives will only provide a summary of the assets, liabilities, and net worth of the House members and not the actual copies of the document. When asked why the 2008 and 2009 SALNs were released, Maling said, “Ginawan lang ng paraan ‘yung dati.” He also said, “I hope you understand.”

Dec. 19, 2011
PCIJ sent a letter to Rep. Niel Tupas Jr., requesting a copy of the SALNs of the members of the prosecution panel and the rest of the members of the 15th Congress. The letter, which was signed by Ilagan and Mangahas, also recounted the previously denied requests with the Office of the Secretary General. A copy of the letter was furnished Secretary General Yap.

Director Maling called PCIJ office around 4:30 pm. Ilagan answered the phone and greeted him “Magandang hapon (Good afternoon).” Maling said (not exact words), “Mukhang ‘di maganda ang hapon, nabasa ko itong letter mo.” Ilagan told Maling that the letter was actually addressed to Tupas. He said, “So nagsend kayo kay Cong. Tupas?” Ilagan said yes.

Maling said that if PCIJ wants the SALN of the members of prosecution panel, Ilagan should fill out and send the SALN request form, like before. Ilagan said that she can do that and send the form by fax. Maling said his office needs the original copy. He also said that PCIJ would have to pay for the reproduction cost. Ilagan said this should be okay because PCIJ always carries the reproduction cost for SALN requests.

Maling then told Ilagan (not exact words): “Akala ko ba okay na tayo dati na summary na lang.” Ilagan said, “Sir, if you would remember, we did not agree to just having the summary. I’ve told you that we’ll not stop and we’ll send another request.” Then Maling said PCIJ’s reason was “manipis.” He said that if the SALNs were needed for a database, then the summary should be okay. He said that his office did not mean to hold the documents. (The reasons PCIJ stated were for “research and reporting purposes” and to “update PCIJ’s library files.”)

Maling then asked why PCIJ needs the actual documents. Ilagan told Maling that the SALN is a public document and PCIJ needs the details of the assets, for example, not just a total figure. He mentioned “manipis” again and said that in law, disclosure of the SALN is not just for “whatever” legal purpose. He said that it’s “not absolute.” Then, Ilagan explained to him again why PCIJ needs the SALNs. Maling said that PCIJ should submit again the Request Form. Ilagan then asked about SALNs of the rest of the members of the 15th Congress. Maling said that this should be included in Request Form.

Dec. 20, 2011
Ilagan sent Maling a clarificatory letter, saying that there is no need to send yet another Request Form because PCIJ has already complied with this before.

Dec. 21, 2011
Ilagan called the Secretary General’s office to make a follow-up. Lito said Maling was already on vacation/leave. Ilagan was told to call in January 2012.

Jan. 3, 2012
Ilagan called the Secretary General’s office to make a follow-up. Emily said Maling was not in the office. She said that the letter had been forwarded to Legal.

Jan. 12, 2012
Ilagan called Legal to make a follow-up. Bles of Legal told Ilagan to call again because the person concerned (Deputy Secretary) stepped out.

From September 2010 to December 2011, PCIJ made a total of 28 calls and sent four letters to the Office of the Secretary General to obtain copies of the July 2010 (upon assumption) and December 2010 SALNs of the 15th Congress members and the CVs and PDS of 14th Congress and 15th Congress members. As of this writing, these have yet to be released by the repository agency. – PCIJ, January 2012

IN ONE of the eight articles of impeachment against Supreme Court Chief Justice Renato Corona, the 188 members of the House of Representatives who signed the complaint censured him for refusing to disclose his statement of assets, liabilities, and net worth or SALN.
 
By their act, the House members raised a virtual Sword of Damocles over those in public office who insist on keeping the full details of their SALNs secret.

But the House accusers could well be accused of a similar omission, and culpable violation of the Constitution and anti-graft laws. Indeed, the PCIJ’s records from 2006 to December 2011 reveal a sorry picture of rank non-disclosure of SALNs not just by Corona and all the justices of the high court since 1992, but also by the incumbent House members who have brought him to trial.

Worst, defiance of the SALN law has been shown as well by the Office of the Ombudsman under Aquino appointee Conchita Carpio-Morales, a retired Supreme Court associate justice who became Ombudsman in July 2011.
 
If one’s failure to disclose SALNs is now an impeachable offense, then a long list of officials should also now be expunged from public office, including Ombudsman Carpio-Morales and by their own assertion, even 185 of the 188 members of the 15th Congress who filed the impeachment complaint against Corona but have not disclosed copies of their own SALNs.

Thus far, only two of the 282 members of the 15th Congress have actually disclosed copies of their 2010 SALN upon request: Mohammed Hussein P. Pangandaman (Lanao del Sur) and Maximo B. Rodriguez Jr. (PL-Abante Mindanao). Neither is among the 188 signatories to the impeachment complaint that the House had submitted to the Senate impeachment court.

The PCIJ was able to obtain the 2010 SALNs of five more members of the Lower House, including three who had signed the impeachment complaint against Corona. But that was only because their SALNs seem to have been mixed inadvertently with the asset records of the members of the 14th Congress that PCIJ was allowed to photocopy early this year.

Summary compliance?

Last year, in apparent creative defiance of Republic Act No. 6713, or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials – which requires disclosure to the public of the actual copies of SALNs – the House merely issued a public release on the summaries of the net worth of the House members.

This is even as the PCIJ had filed four request letters for SALNs of the members of the 15th Congress from September 2010 to December 2011. The first three were addressed to House Secretary General Marilyn B. Yap. The fourth and most recent letter dated Dec. 19, 2011 was addressed to the House justice committee chair, Iloilo Rep. Niel Tupas Jr., lead prosecutor in the Corona impeachment trial.

Simultaneously, also on Dec. 19, 2011, the PCIJ sent a new request letter to the Supreme Court addressed to Court Administrator Midas P. Marquez, in yet another effort to secure the SALNs of Corona and his 14 associate justices, from their first year of appointment to the tribunal.

Last week, Marquez had promised to give the PCIJ an official statement from the tribunal on its latest request but also said that because of Corona’s upcoming impeachment trial, positive action may not come. The first en banc session of the high court is scheduled on Jan. 17, 2012 yet, he said.

In October 2008, the PCIJ had filed a pleading with the “Special Committee to Review the Policy on SALNs and PDS” chaired by then Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario that the en banc had created, in response to repeated requests that PCIJ had filed since 2001 for the SALNs of the justices and judges.

The PCIJ is a party to the Administrative Matter 09-8-06 SC and 09-8-07-CA cases filed with the committee. After Nazario’s retirement in 2010, the committee’s task has supposedly been entrusted to a new study committee headed by Marquez.

The high court’s policy to recede in the dark, especially where SALNs of all judiciary personnel are concerned, actually began with Andres B. Narvasa, who served as chief justice from December 8, 1991 to November 30, 1998. The Narvasa court had been marred by reports, including a number authored by the PCIJ, alleging multiple instances of bribery and corruption involving some justices. “The best Supreme Court that money can buy,” legal circles had described the tribunal at the time.

The exposes triggered the early retirement of an associate justice even as the Narvasa court also summoned lawyers it suspected to be among the PCIJ’¦s unnamed sources to an inquiry board composed of justices at Padre Faura.

Those who succeeded Narvasa, Hilario G. Davide Jr. (who served from November 30, 1998 to December 20, 2005), Reynato S. Puno (who served from December 20, 2005 to May 17, 2010), and Corona (chief justice since May 2010) followed the practice of secrecy in regard to the SALNs of all judiciary personnel.

Not lawful compliance

The Constitution and anti-graft laws require the disclosure of the real, detailed SALNs of public officials, within 10 working days after these have been filed within the yearly April 30 deadline. Disclosing summaries of entries in the SALNs, such as what the 15th Congress and two associate justices had done recently, is not contemplated in the law as full compliance.

To be fair, supposedly as an accommodation of the PCIJ, the House shared copies of the SALNs of the members of the 14th Congress under Speaker Prospero Nograles, Jr. that ended its term of office in May 2010.

Still, even Tupas, interviewed by the PCIJ, acknowledged the gross omission of the House in withholding copies of the 2010 SALNs of the current legislators. “Yes, what should be revealed are the full details of the assets, liabilities, and net worth, copies of the SALNs,” he told PCIJ.

“I didn’t know until recently that was how it’s done in the House. I didn’t know it’s that bad. I didn’t know this issue with SALNs is that complicated,” Tupas said.

“The point is, in the Supreme Court, there is zero compliance,” he said. “The Constitutional provision is clear: Release your SALNs, that is compliance.” He said he was willing to release his own SALN, adding that, “we have to start somewhere somehow in enforcing the law.”

Tupas admits that by their failure, a long line of public officials, possibly including the Ombudsman, constitutional commissioners, and House members, who have failed to disclose their SALNs might now have to be summoned as candidates for possible impeachment. Promised Tupas: “I will hold hearings on compliance with the SALNs law soon. For all other SALNs, there should be a congressional investigation.”

Over the last 26 months, the PCIJ had filed and refiled request letters over to secure copies of the SALNs, Personal Data Sheets/Curriculum Vitae (PDS/CVs) of the members of the Lower Chamber. Four letters were filed with the 15th Congress to secure copies of the SALNs as of July 2010 (assumption of office) and December 2010. For the 14th Congress, PCIJ wrote two letters of request, the first in October 2009, the second in May 2010.

‘Tedious’ process

Failing to get a response, PCIJ included its request for such documents for members of the 14th Congress in subsequent letters asking for copies of similar sets of papers covering the 15th Congress.

The PCIJ sent letters of requests dated Sept. 6, 2010, Feb. 17, 2011, and Feb. 24, 2011 to Marilyn B. Yap, House secretary general for the SALNs and the personal data sheets/curriculum vitae (PDS/CVs) of the members of the 14th Congress, and the members of the 15th Congress, upon their assumption into office as of June/July 2010, and as of December 2010.

Yap approved the release of SALNs filed for 2008 and 2009 of the members of the 14th Congress, which was dominated by allies of then President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. But the request for those of the 15th Congress members was denied.

On May 4, 2011, Director Roberto P. Maling of the Secretary General’s Office told PCIJ that the Records Management Service would not able to provide copies of the SALNs because the process is “tedious.” He said PCIJ was able to get copies of the 2008 and 2009 SALNs because the Records Office just made an exemption.

When asked about future SALN requests, Maling said the House of Representatives will only provide a summary of the assets, liabilities, and net worth of the House members and not the actual copies of the document.

Pangandaman and Rodriguez of the 15th House, however, on their own sent PCIJ copies of the SALN in response to its request.

Secured by mistake

The PCIJ also obtained the July 2010 SALNs of incumbent Representatives Pastor M. Alcover Jr. (PL-Anad), Dakila Carlo E. Cua (Quirino), Salvio B. Fortuno (Camarines Sur), and Alfredo A. Garbin, Jr. (PL-Ako Bicol), and the December 2010 SALN of Rep. Herminia B. Roman (Bataan). By some fluke, these had been included among the SALNs of the members of the 14th Congress that PCIJ was allowed to photocopy.

Cua, Garbin, and Roman signed the impeachment complaint against Corona; Pangandaman, Pastor, and Rodriguez did not. Fortuno’s name does not appear in either list.

Yet before 2008, the Office of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives had responded favorably to requests from the PCIJ for copies of the SALNs and PDS/CVs of the House members.

The Senate is by far the most exemplary agency in its compliance with the law. It has consistently disclosed the asset records of all its members over the years, including those making up the current Upper House.

On Dec. 19, 2011, PCIJ, still bent on getting copies of the SALNs of the members of the 15th House, filed a sixth letter request, this time addressed to Rep. Tupas. A copy of the request was furnished to Secretary General Yap.

The request was apparently forwarded to Maling, who promptly rang up the PCIJ office phone the same afternoon. When greeted with a courtesy “good afternoon” by the PCIJ staffer who had picked up the phone, Maling replied that it didn’t look like a good afternoon at all and that he had read the PCIJ letter. He then said that if PCIJ wanted the SALN of the members of prosecution panel, it should fill out the SALN request form and pay for the reproduction cost.

Maling also said that he had assumed that the summary generated by the House had been sufficient for PCIJ’s purposes. Reminded that the PCIJ did not agree to this and precisely sent follow-up request letters for the complete SALNs, he said the PCIJ’s reasons for securing the SALNs – research, reporting, and updating of its database and library files – were “manipis” or “superficial.”

Maling said the House did not mean to hold the documents, but asked whyever the PCIJ needed the details of the assets of the House members. He asserted that under the law, disclosure of such documents is not just for “whatever” legal purpose and is “not absolute.”

On May 11, 2011, the House released a 2010 SALN summary list signed by Atty. Ricardo Bering of the House Records Management Service and Director Jose Ma. Antonio Tuaño of the Administrative Management Bureau.

It contained the total amount of the real properties, personal and other properties, assets, liabilities and net worth of the members of the 15th Congress ranked from highest to lowest by net worth. News reports about the list ran on May 13 and 14, 2011.

Carpio-Morales, too

It seemed to be a case of déjà vu for PCIJ, which had earlier heard a similar argument from the Ombudsman’s Office.

On Sept. 8, 2011, the PCIJ filed with the office of Ombudsman Carpio-Morales an omnibus request for copies of the SALNs of President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, Vice President Jejomar C. Binay, former Ombudsman Merceditas N. Gutierrez, and other senior officials of the Ombudsman, among others.

In the same request letter, the PCIJ also sought Carpio-Morales’s assistance in securing the SALNs and the PDS/CVs of the members of the House of Representatives, executives of the constitutional commissions, the Supreme Court justices, and star-rank officers of the uniformed services. Previously, these PCIJ requests had all been denied and referred to other agencies like the Office of the President and the Ombudsman.
 
Attached to the request to the Ombudsman were the letters of denials and referrals from the same agencies that PCIJ had collected over the last six years.

The PCIJ asked Carpio-Morales to help reverse the tide of non-compliance with the SALN law. Instead of doing so, Carpio-Morales, replying through Assistant Ombudsman Asryman T. Rafanan, simply advised the PCIJ to file a new request, as had been required by the controversial Memorandum Circular No. 01 Series of 2009 that was issued by her impeached predecessor Merceditas N. Gutierrez.

Gutierrez’s restrictive circular provides “that the requester should accomplish a SALN Request Form which should, among others, identify or indicate a legitimate reason as the purpose for the request, and which should be subscribed and sworn to before any prosecutor in the Office of the Ombudsman.” The requirement for the request to be subscribed and sworn to before a prosecutor is not required in the SALN law.

Nonetheless, the PCIJ had precisely filed a sworn SALN Request Form on March 30, 2011, in compliance with Gutierrez’s circular. A copy was attached to the PCIJ letter addressed to Carpio-Morales. But Rafanan apparently did not even browse through sheafs of documents that the PCIJ submitted in its omnibus request for the SALNs of all other officials who have rebuffed the PCIJ’s requests for SALNs since 2006.
 
The PCIJ also wrote that its request was made “to assist our work as journalists and researchers.” But Rafanan replied, “(You) have not advanced a clear and specific legitimate reason to justify you request for the release of the PDS or the disclosure of information of a personal nature of the enumerated public officials whose PDS are in the custody of the Office of the Ombudsman.”

Rafanan added, “The CV is not a public document but a private document, which is not required by the Civil Service Commission to be filed by a public official or employee.”

Told about the evident reluctance of the new Ombudsman to lift the veil of secrecy on SALNs, Tupas remarked: “The new Ombudsman should be the role model here in releasing SALNs. We impeached Merci Gutierrez for not disclosing her SALN.”

Valte won’t disclose

Interestingly, until four months ago, even the president’s deputy spokesperson Abigail Valte had cited “security” concerns arising from the disclosure of SALNs as one more reason why she said Aquino is reluctant to endorse the Freedom of Information bill.
 
At a press conference on Sept. 23, 2011, Valte had voiced her reluctance to reveal her own SALN. “That for me personally is a concern because I’m the one here (in government) and not my family,” she said. “These are the types of concerns that we are trying to solve when it comes to the freedom of information bill.”
 
Yet just two days after the impeachment complaint against Corona was filed on Dec. 12, 2011, no less than President Aquino challenged the former to go public with his asset records. Two days later on Dec. 15, Valte’s immediate boss and Aquino spokesperson Edwin Lacierda exhorted the high court to reverse its resolution banning the disclosure of the SALNs of the justices, judges, and all other personnel of the judiciary.

“Under the Constitution,” Lacierda said, “it is very, very clear that all government officials, and in fact the Supreme Court was mentioned in that particular constitutional provision that they should disclose to the public their statement of assets and liabilities.”

“They can change the ruling anytime because that is an internal process for them,” he said. “That is an internal decision for them. Since we are calling for transparency, for accountability, I don’t think that is an unreasonable request for the public to know the statement of assets, liability (sic), and net worth of any government official.”

According to Lacierda, “kami na nasa executive branch, we are more subjected to threats. We deal with the people more. We are more exposed and yet we willingly disclose our SALN so there should be no reason for them not to disclose. It is not unreasonable for the public to request for the release of their SALN.” – With research and reporting by Karol Anne M. Ilagan, PCIJ, January 2012

For instance, while press freedom has broad and firm guarantees in law and jurisprudence in this country, the Philippines remains one of the deadliest places in the world for journalists, even as the executive and legislative branches have been slow to move on strategic reforms, including the Freedom of Information Act.

Reporters and editors also zealously guard and assert their freedom and resist all attempts by state authorities to restrict their trade, and yet self-regulation by professional and industry associations has always lacked vigor and constancy. Indeed, self-criticism of media by media remains scant and thus ineffectual, even as competition for sales, revenues, and audience share drives most editorial decisions of most gatekeepers.

Moreover, as much as journalists assert their independence from state authorities, and insist on the strict observance of the laws by political leaders, media managers have tended to ignore and neglect concerns of media rank and file about economic benefits, safety provisions for those assigned dangerous areas, and security of tenure for correspondents and stringers in the provinces.

Gender equity in junior to senior positions has markedly improved in major media agencies, but only token to modest print space and air time have been devoted by media in the capital region to the issues of women, those from minority ethnic and faith groups, the marginalized, non-celebrities, and the provinces.

These are among the findings of the Asian Media Barometer: The Philippines 2011 Report that will be launched on Tuesday, December 13, at a forum in Quezon City for journalists, and students and teachers of the country’s major journalism schools.

This first Philippine report of the Asian Media Barometer, a project of the Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung (FES), was co-organized and co-authored by the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ).

Fear & freedom

“The media landscape in the Philippines is characterized by diversity, freedom, an active stock of journalists and citizens and an executive and legislature slow on media reforms,” the report said.

“However,” it added, “operating in a culture of impunity and in one of the most dangerous countries for journalists, it comes as no surprise that even the free and rambunctious media of the Philippines reflect the constraints of fear and a growing concentration of ownership in their journalistic practice.”

“Within this context, the courage of many journalists is as remarkable as the lack of self- criticism of the media remains deplorable,” said the report.

Other findings of the ANMB Philippine Report include:

• The standards of reporting are very varied. Low salaries and the lack of skills and training often lead to poor writing and reporting.
• Media practitioners complain about the deteriorating quality of graduates coming out of journalism schools.
• Whilst TV anchors make more money than their education warrants, small community newspapers can’t pay living wages for their reporters or correspondents.
• Poor unionization of the journalistic workforce outside of the top television networks leaves journalists in small cities and rural areas exposed to the whims of the publishers. The result is a subculture of corruption where some journalists take bribes to perform their professional function.
• The Philippines has no independent broadcasting regulator that issues licenses in the public interest; neither has the state-owned PTV-4 a board representing society at large.
• Whereas previous governments had run PTV-4 as their mere propaganda arm, the current administration is said to propose a law for the transformation of the national into a public broadcaster. But the very low ratings and the considerable debt and losses of PTV-4 will make this a difficult political project.
• Unlike in some other Asian countries community radio stations have not taken off and usually serve only communities of interests and not small geographical communities.

Media measure tool

The Asian Media Barometer or ANMB is an in-depth and comprehensive description and measurement system for national media environments in Asia. Unlike other press surveys or media indices the ANMB is a local self-assessment exercise based on criteria derived from international standards for media freedom.

It thus serves as a practical lobbying tool for media organizations. Its results are presented to the public of the respective country with the aim to push and lobby for an improvement of the media situation using international standards as benchmarks, which are then integrated into the advocacy work by the FES-offices and their local partners.

The design and method of the ANMB had been adapted for Asia from the African Media Barometer (AMB), which is based on homegrown criteria derived from African Protocols and Declarations, such as the Declaration on Principles on Freedom of Expression in Africa (2002). Since 2005 the African Media Barometer has been held more than 70 times in over 28 African countries in intervals of two to three years. It offers FES and its local partners a long-term analysis of media landscapes and is used as a valuable instrument in their campaigns for media reforms.

Yet because a different situation exists is Asia, individual attempts have been made in several South Asian countries to come up with a charter or indicators of freedom of expression and freedom of the media. Unfortunately, these initiatives have not been successfully established within individual countries, let alone implemented on a sub-regional, or a more ambitious regional scale.

In fact, the Joint Declaration of 2006 by the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression and his counterparts from regional organizations notes that Asia-Pacific region lacks such a mechanism that would pass up for an Asian Charter or Declaration on Freedom of Expression.

Nonetheless, the absence of such a charter is no excuse for Asian governments to restrict media freedom or deny citizens their right to access information. Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which guarantees freedom of expression, including “the right to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas,” applies to all UN member-states.

No protocol for Asia

The UN system has confirmed the international benchmarks being used in the Asian Media Barometer. The only Asian document that has tried to suggest non-binding benchmarks on media freedom, however, is the Bangkok Declaration on Information and Broadcasting of 2003.

In that document, the Ministers of Information and Broadcasting from various countries in the Asia–Pacific region, as well as heads of radio and television organizations, policy makers, decision-makers, scholars, and representatives of international organizations, discussed and signed on to recommendations on Freedom of Information and Broadcasting Legislation.

Ahead of the Philippine Report, the FES had also sponsored the conduct of the Asian Media Barometer for India and Pakistan in 2009, and for Thailand in 2010.

ANMB methodology

The methodology of the Asian Media Barometer involves conducting a two-day intensive panel discussion every two to three years with experts, including at least five media practitioners and five representatives from civil society. The panelists meet to assess the media situation in their own country.

They discuss the national media environment according to 45 predetermined indicators on which they have to score in an anonymous vote on a scale of 1 to 5.

The indicators are formulated as goals, which are derived from international political protocols and declarations. An FES-trained consultant moderates the discussion and scoring, and edits the country report.

After a discussion of each indicator, the panel members score the indicator in an anonymous vote, according to the following grading system:

• Country does not meet indicator, for a Grade of 1.2
• Country meets only a few aspects of indicator, 2.3
• Country meets some aspects of indicator, 3.
• Country meets most aspects of indicator, 4. 5
• Country meets all aspects of the indicator, 5.

This means that if the country does not meet the indicator, the score will be 1. If the country meets all aspects of the indicator it would be 5, which is the best score possible.

The sum of all individual indicator scores was divided by the number of panel members to determine the average score for each indicator. These average indicator scores are added up to form average sector scores, which then made up the overall country score.

The final, qualitative report summarizes the general content of the discussion and provides the average score for each indicator plus the sector scores and the overall country score. In the report panelists are not quoted by name to protect them from possible repercussions.

Over time the biennial or tri-annual reports measure the media development in that particular country and should form the basis for a political discussion on media reform.

Philippine panel

The 104-page Asian Media Barometer: The Philippines 2011 Report resulted from a two-day panel discussion held October 8-9, 2011 at Canyon Woods Resort in Tagaytay City, Batangas province, with the following expert-panelists:

Arnold E. Belleza, executive editor of BusinessWorld
Lesley Jeanne Y. Cordero, assistant secretary for Legislative Affairs, Presidential Communications Operations Office
Miriam Grace A. Go, fellow, Newsbreak
Cherry Ann T. Lim, managing editor, Sun.Star Cebu
Solomon F. Lumba, assistant professor, College of Law, University of the Philippines
Norkhalia Mae Mambuay-Campong, information officer, Reform ARMM Now
Rowena C. Paraan, secretary-general, National Union of Journalists of the Philippines
Peter Angelo R. Perfecto, executive director, Makati Business Club
Melinda Quintos-De Jesus, executive director, Center for Media Freedom and Responsibility
Danton R. Remoto, desk manager and head of Research, News 5
Jonas C. Soltes, regional correspondent, Philippine Daily Inquirer (Bicol)

Karol Anne M. Ilagan, PCIJ researcher director, was researcher, and Malou Mangahas, PCIJ executive director, rapporteur of the Asian Media Barometer-The Philippines 2011 Report.

Rolf Paasch, FES Media Coordinator, served as moderator, and Marina Kramer, also of FES, as editor of the report.

Berthold Leimbach, FES resident representative in the Philippines, attended the panel discussion and supervised the project. – PCIJ, December 2011

UNLESS THE Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC) moves faster than usual, the clan implicated in the Nov. 23, 2009 Maguindanao Massacre might soon retake control of what by all accounts is a scandalously vast estate of money and mansions, and wheels and weapons it had acquired while governing over a dirt-poor province.

Next week, on Dec. 2, a freeze order on 597 bank accounts, 142 firearms, 132 motor vehicles, and 113 houses and lots, recorded in the names of 27 Ampatuan family members and their associates, will lapse.

The bank accounts alone are estimated to be worth more than a billion pesos – multiple times more money than what the Ampatuans who held elective office had declared in their asset disclosure records to be their lawful incomes and net worth.

The AMLC – which is unduly secretive in the country but quite open about its operations in international forums and toward donor agencies – is mum about what it plans to do next.

Unfortunately, it barely inspires confidence, if the last two years since the massacre are any reference.

Indeed, by most indications, the AMLC and monetary and banking officials, along with the banks, have taken largely a series of administrative half-steps and missteps against the Ampatuans, who until the massacre that killed 58 people, including 32 media workers, were the lords of Maguindanao.

In truth, the story of how the Ampatuans managed to move massive amounts of money to and from hundreds of bank accounts is also the story of why regulatory agencies failed to enforce banking laws vis-à-vis the banks.

Too, it is the story of why the banks had acquiesced to keep the financial deals of the Ampatuans secret for so long, in clear violation of their duty to report “suspicious transactions” under banking and AMLC rules.

And whether or not the banks failed to report the Ampatuans’ series of suspicious transactions in the years before the massacre occurred, and in the 18 months that followed, begs the question of whether or not the AMLC had taken action, any action at all, against the banks.

Can’t bare moves?

In fact, it was only last May that the AMLC formally moved to freeze the multibillion assets and hundreds of bank accounts of the Ampatuans.

On Jun. 8, 2011, the Court of Appeals, acting on the AMLC’s 94-page “urgent ex-parte petition for freeze order,” issued a 20-day provisional asset preservation order. This was followed by a six-month freeze order, again on AMLC’s motion, that would lapse on Dec. 2, 2011.

Recent repeated requests by the PCIJ for an interview with AMLC’s senior officials yielded just this email reply: “We cannot disclose to anyone what we plan to do in relation to cases that we have filed or intending to file because this will telegraph our moves to the persons that we are investigating or prosecuting.”

Specific questions about whether or not to banks had filed suspicious transaction reports on the Ampatuan bank accounts prior to the Maguindanao massacre, and what the AMLC had done or plan to do either way, received this curt reply: “We cannot cite particular suspicious or covered transaction reports, specific cases and identify persons subject of our legal action because this will violate the confidentiality provisions of the AMLA (Anti-Money Laundering Act) of 2001, as amended and its Revised Implementing Rules & Regulations.”

But the reply also stated that the AMLC secretariat “investigates suspicious transactions and covered transactions deemed suspicious, money laundering activities and other violations of the AMLA. Hence, it immediately analyzes and investigates suspicious transactions reported to it by banks and other financial institutions. It also analyzes and investigates covered transactions  (a transaction is considered covered where the amount involved exceeds P500 thousand within one banking day), which are deemed suspicious after initial inquiry.”

Yet by filing its urgent ex-parte petition before the Court of Appeals a full 18 months after the massacre, the AMLC had sounded the alarm much too belatedly on the financial deals of the Ampatuans.

This is even though it seemed to appreciate the need for quick action on the clan’s assets, arguing in its motion for a freeze order: “Unless the bank accounts and other properties subject of this petition are frozen and placed under the custody of the law, there is imminent certainty that the funds contained therein and other identified properties will be withdrawn, removed, transferred, concealed or otherwise dispose of, thereby placing them beyond the reach of law enforcers, and would render ineffective government effort to forfeit the subject assets and prevent their use for other unlawful activities.”
A report by the Office of the Ombudsman, which conducted a lifestyle check on the Ampatuans in 2010, said that Ampatuan Sr. alone “has amassed unexplained wealth manifestly and excessively out of proportion to his legitimate income for the years 2000 to 2009 in the aggregate amount of P183,424,326.71.”

Andal Sr. illiquid?

But Sigfrid Fortun, counsel of Andal Sr., takes exception to details asserted in the AMLC petition. “Andal Sr. is illiquid and has no cash to spend for his families’ needs,” Fortun says in an emailed reply to PCIJ’s queries.

He also writes that his client, in his comments on the lifestyle check report, had said, “most of the assets listed as theirs are not owned by them as the Panel made assumptions without factual basis.  Some of their source documents are dated or obsolete.”

“The bank accounts are a listing of all accounts bearing their name whether existing since the ’70s or closed for some reason,” adds Fortun.  “They do maintain bank accounts but most if not all of them had been closed even before any investigation of their supposed ill-gotten wealth commenced.”

According to Fortun, the family of Bai Leila Uy, the first of Andal Sr.’s six wives, “has significant landholdings, which became revenue source for new businesses organized by Andal Sr. before he became a public official.” Most of the properties registered in Andal Sr.’s name “were acquired before he became a public official.”

Old, new accounts

Fortun could be correct in regard to some of the bank accounts being old, such as those enrolled with the Equitable PCIBank, which has since been acquired and networked under Banco de Oro Unibank Inc. In the AMLC documents, 73 bank accounts of the Ampatuans were supposedly opened with Equitable PCIBank, and with Banco de Oro, another 231 accounts, or nearly 40 percent of the 597 total accounts.

Interestingly, though, the 597 bank accounts on the AMLC’s list include 46 with the Land Bank of the Philippines, and another six with the Development Bank of the Philippines – government depository banks that are allowed in law to receive and disburse public funds. These accounts were listed mostly in the names of Zaldy and Andal Jr., who had served as elective officials.

A week after the appellate court froze the accounts, civil servants in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) had held a rally in Cotabato City to protest the inclusion of their salaries and benefits supposedly deposited in the one of the Land Bank accounts in the name of the Ampatuans.

The court’s freeze order apparently had the uncanny result of also freezing the salaries of the supposedly 30,000 employees of ARMM, including 22,000 public school teachers, as well as funds for the core shelter program that the Aquino administration had planned to roll out for local folk.

Why the account with the Land Bank branch on Magallanes Street in Cotabato City was opened in the name of an Ampatuan, and apparently continued to receive public funds 18 months after the massacre, remains a mystery.

Failed regulators

To be sure the Ampatuans’ intricate web of bank accounts points to two failures: the first, the failure of the banks to comply with clearly established banking and AMLC rules, and the second, the failure of the AMLC and monetary agencies to regulate the banks and enforce the laws.

And yet the AMLC alone – from its birth 10 years ago on Sept. 29, 2001 through Republic Act No. 9160, or the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001 – has enjoyed broad powers and command of resources to be able to do its job well.

Under the rules implementing RA 9160, the AMLC is a collegial body composed of Bangko Sentral governor (chairperson) and the heads of the Insurance Commission and the Securities and Exchange Commission as members. The law christened the AMLC with the fancy title of being “the Philippines’ Financial Intelligence Unit.”

The AMLC has embraced a lofty vision: “To be a world-class financial intelligence unit that will help establish and maintain an internationally compliant and effective anti-money laundering regime which will provide the Filipino people with a sound, dynamic and strong financial system in an environment conducive to the promotion of social justice, political stability and sustainable economic growth. Towards this goal, the AMLC shall, without fear or favor, investigate and cause the prosecution of money laundering offenses.”

The AMLC secretariat, headed by its executive director with a five-year fixed term, administers day-to-day operations with a staff complement of undisclosed numbers. Some AMLC personnel are seconded from the Bangko Sentral and other agencies, while others are consultants with fees covered by donor agencies.

In 2011, the AMLC received a P9.7-million budget, down from its so far largest annual allocation of P25.65 million in 2010. This was slightly higher than the P20.65 million that the agency got in 2009, P15.2 million in 2008, and P10 million in 2007 and 2005. This year’s budget allowed the AMLC zero funds for capital outlay and intelligence gathering.

The agency budget has consistently reflected no allocation for personal services. It does not disclose, too, the millions of dollars in grants, technical assistance, and overseas training for personnel that it has received from donor agencies. These include the Asian Development Bank (that gave US$1 million in 2002 for “Strengthening the Anti-Money Laundering Regime,” and US$400,000 more in 2005), and the European Union (that gave EUR 811, 000 or US$ 1,057,245 from September 2005 to September 2008).


Money laundering

RA 9160 criminalized money laundering in the Philippines and introduced “civil forfeiture as an appropriate remedy for the seizure and forfeiture in favor of the State, without the necessity of conviction or prosecution in a criminal case, of monetary instrument, property or proceeds involved in or related to an unlawful activity or money laundering offense as defined in the law.”

The law defined money laundering as “a crime whereby the proceeds of an unlawful activity are transacted thereby making them appear to have originated from legitimate sources.”

It spelled out the “unlawful activities” that are “predicate offenses” to money laundering include “any act or omission or series or combination thereof involving or having direct relation” to kidnapping for ransom; drug trafficking and other violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002; graft and corruption; plunder; robbery and extortion; jueteng and masiao; piracy on the high seas; qualified theft; smuggling; swindling; hijacking; destructive arson and murder, including those perpetrated by terrorists against non-combatant persons and similar targets; fraudulent practices and other violations under the Securities Regulation Code of 2000; and felonies or offenses of a similar nature punishable under the penal laws of other countries.

Covered institutions

The law allowed the AMLC access to and supervision over a broad range of “covered institutions,” or practically the whole universe of entities under the regulatory command of the Bangko Sentral, the Insurance Commission, and the Securities and Exchange Commission.

These include:

• Offshore banking units, quasi-banks, trust entities, non-stock savings and loan associations, pawnshops, and all other institutions including their subsidiaries and affiliates supervised and/or regulated by the Bangko Sentral.
• Insurance companies, insurance agents, insurance brokers, professional reinsurers, reinsurance brokers, holding companies, holding company systems, and all other persons and entities supervised and/or regulated by the Insurance Commission.
• Securities dealers, brokers, salesmen, associated persons of brokers or dealers, investment houses, investment agents and consultants, trading advisors, and other entities managing securities or rendering similar services, mutual funds or open-end investment companies, close-end investment companies, common trust funds, pre-need companies or issuers and other similar entities; foreign exchange corporations, money changers, money payment, remittance, and transfer companies and other similar entities, and other entities administering or otherwise dealing in currency, commodities or financial derivatives based thereon, valuable objects, cash substitutes and other similar monetary instruments or property supervised and/or regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission.

Thus, under the AMLC’s rules, all banks and covered institutions are under “mandatory duty and obligation” to file “covered transactions reports” or CTRs and “suspicious transaction reports” or STRs, within five banking days from the date of the transactions.
By all indications, the steady spike in the amounts of money and the number of bank accounts that the Ampatuans had chalked up over the years should not have escaped the notice of their banks and the AMLC.

Suspicious transactions

The AMLC’s rules, as amended in March 2003, specify that “covered transactions” I are “transactions in cash or other equivalent monetary instrument involving a total amount in excess of five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) within one (1) banking day.”
On the other hand, “suspicious transactions” are defined as transactions with covered institutions, “regardless of the amounts involved,” where any of the following circumstances exist:

• “There is no underlying legal or trade obligation, purpose or economic justification;
• “The client is not properly identified;
• “The amount involved is not commensurate with the business or financial capacity of the client;
• “Taking into account all known circumstances, it may be perceived that the client’s transaction is structured in order to avoid being the subject of reporting requirements under the (Anti-Money Laundering) Act;
• “Any circumstance relating to the transaction which is observed to deviate from the profile of the client and/or the client’s past transactions with the covered institution;
• “The transaction is in any way related to an unlawful activity or offense under this Act that is about to be, is being or has been committed; or
• “Any transaction that is similar or analogous to any of the foregoing.”

In its ex-parte report, the AMLC made no specific allegations about big amounts involved in single-day transactions for any of the bank accounts listed in the names of the Ampatuans and their associates. But under two principles that the AMLC has repeatedly exhorted the banks to observe, due diligence by the bankers and their account persons could reasonably be expected.

The first is the KYC or “know your client” rule, and the second, the matter of monitoring PEPs or “politically exposed persons” or politicians, political personalities, and their agents and intermediaries who are known to hold tremendous power and influence, and sometimes “abuse the system, dirty money will continue to end up in banks, often through trusts and corporate vehicles set up by agents and administered by unrelated third parties.”

Silent partners

Why the Ampatuans’ unusual trail of money escaped the notice of the banks and the AMLC is a tragic mystery. It is possibly also a story being repeated many times over across the country where banks and bankers continue to serve as willing vassals and silent partners of crooks in public and private offices.
In the case of the Ampatuans, some banks – all located outside Maguindanao where no single bank exists – had been favored more than others to serve as repositories of the clan’s millions.
The 597 bank accounts listed in the names of the 27 Ampatuans and their associates, according to the AMLC ex-parte report, include:

Table 1. Bank Account Holders and Number of Accounts

Table 2. The Banks and the Ampatuans

The AMLC may have broad and full powers to run after money laundering and all its predicate and related crimes but it offers little proof that it has been as effective in running after grafters and crooks in public office.

Poor to fair record

A July 2009 Mutual Evaluation Report of the AMLC conducted by Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering, with assistance from the World Bank, revealed that on its first eight years in office, the AMLC had a poor to fair record, depending on the predicate offenses or cases involved.

From 2003 to January 2007, the AMLC referred to the Department of Justice five complaints of estafa, two of pyramiding/ponzi scheme, and only one case each of qualified theft, kidnapping for ransom, and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. To the Ombudsman, it submitted one case of 105 counts of plunder (against the ‘Euro generals’). The civil forfeiture case of the Ampatuans brings to three the AMLC’s harvest of corruption complaints it has filed in its first decade of life.

In terms of money restituted in favor of the state, the AMLC may be said to have made modest strides, considering its modest budget and small core personnel complement. Excluding the Ampatuans’ estate and bank accounts, as of October 2008 the AMLC has supposedly netted P21.3 million from terminated civil forfeiture cases, apart from a possible P287.8 million that could come from pending cases.

But toward banks defying AMLC rules, the agency is able to show only paltry results. Until October 2008, it reported collecting just P2.1 million in fines of P100,000 each imposed on 21 banks, even as it has yet to collect another P1million in unpaid penalties from 10 other financial institutions.

The latest data on the AMLC’s work are difficult to secure. The latest annual report posted on its official website dates back to 2007. But then again, the reticence of AMLC officials to grant requests for interview and information by Philippine media is the exact opposite of their willingness to open AMLC records and operations to foreign donor agencies and at conferences abroad.

Effete vs corruption

A senior banking regulator says AMLC could only render an effete role in uncovering corruption and plunder cases because of the failure of regulatory agencies, and the indifference, or lack of fear, on the part of banks and bankers toward regulators.

“There is compliance in the breach,” says the banker. “The structures, sanctions, and penalties are not strong enough, and the regulators are not feared or held in awe y bankers.”

Indeed, except for one rural banker, the article of faith that big banks hold is that not any single big banker has been jailed, or may ever see the slammer, for fraud or other violations of banking laws.

The banker notes that all recent big cases of banks going under for corruption or poor management had ended up in the government shelling out billions of pesos in bailout money. Soon after, the banker says, those who had sent their banks to bankruptcy had been recycled and returned to top posts in other banks.

The banker also says that while bank officials tend to strictly follow AMLC’s rules on filing CTRs and STRs in the big cities, in areas where warlords and political clans dominate, “where the rule of law is not there but the rule of the gun, banking rules do not apply.”

Politicians, especially those with virulent tendencies, had and would always intimidate bankers. Says the banker: “If they made deposits at the time they were not notorious at all, the bankers could just say they are valued clients. Now that their reputation is in ruins, as bankers you just hope that their account stays there in your bank.”

“Our monetary policies are okay,” the banker says, “but there’s a hell of a lot to be said in terms of regulatory aspects, legal standards, international standards, personal ties, classmates, and friends getting in the way of the law.” - PCIJ, November 2011

FORMER Maguindanao Governor Andal Salibo Ampatuan Sr. is, as far as his statements of assets, liabilities, and net worth (SALN) are concerned, a simple farmer. His son Zaldy, formerly the regional governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), has no other source of income, apart from the pawnshop owned by his wife Johaira.

Yet these two members of the Ampatuan clan alone own 65 properties scattered throughout Maguindanao, Cotabato City, Davao City, and even in ritzy Dasmariñas Village in Makati, home to many foreign embassies and a refuge of the country’s rich and famous. These real properties range from a two-hectare farm lot in Cotabato City, to magnificent structures in Davao City and Shariff Aguak that tower over the simple abodes of one of the country’s poorest provinces. One residential property in Davao City alone covers at least 4,000 square meters, and has a mansion that dwarfs other high-end homes with its opulence.

These properties are included in an array of assets of the Ampatuans that are covered by a 23-page freeze order issued by the Court of Appeals. The order was first issued on Jun. 6, 2011. It has since been extended, but unless there is another extension, the order will remain in effect only until Dec. 2 this year.

It was the Anti-Money Laundering Council or AMLC that had asked the court for a freeze order on all the known assets of the Ampatuans, who were implicated in the infamous 2009 Maguindanao Massacre.

AMLC based its petition, which it submitted to the Court on May 30, 2011, on two major documents: the results of a special audit conducted by the Commission on Audit (COA) on the expenditures of the ARMM from January 2008 to September 2009, and the results of a lifestyle check conducted by a special panel headed by Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao Humphrey T. Monteroso.

But it was the Ombudsman panel’s lifestyle check, submitted on June 29, 2010, that appeared to be a major factor in convincing the Court of Appeals to issue the freeze order. (Then Ombudsman Merceditas Gutierrez approved Deputy Ombudsman Monteroso’s report on Aug. 16, 2010. Copies of the lifestyle check report were to have been submitted to the Bureau of Internal Revenue, the Philippine National Police, and COA.)

The Ombudsman’s lifestyle check showed that the two Ampatuan family members “accumulated wealth in excess and out of proportion to their legitimate income.”

In part, the report said that based on the documents gathered by the panel, “Andal S. Ampatuan Sr. owned at least 27 houses and lots located at Shariff Aguak, Cotabato City, and Davao City worth an estimated P90,463,262.78, most of which were not declared in his Statements of Assets, and Liabilities.”

The lifestyle panel noted that Andal Sr. declared real properties worth only P21,506,500 when he last filed his SALN in 2007.

Monteroso’s lifestyle panel, meanwhile, said that Zaldy owned at least 38 houses and lots located in Shariff Aguak, Cotabato City, Davao City, and in Metro Manila “worth an estimated P58,488,545.40, most of which were not declared in his Statements of Assets and Liabilities.”

Zaldy had declared real properties worth P34,196,333.50 in his last SALN filed in 2009.

According to the Ombudsman panel, the younger Ampatuan’s real properties include:

• A stately mansion along Tamarind Road in upscale Dasmariñas Village in Makati, reportedly listed under the name of a Delia Sumail. The mansion presently appears unoccupied, although sources revealed that Zaldy used to conduct some of his businesses here when he was in Manila. Too, staffers from the ARMM liaison office in Manila would deliver documents meant for Zaldy’s perusal to this address.
• A residential unit on the 21st floor of the Lotus Tower of the Oriental Gardens condominium along Pasong Tamo in Makati, near Buendia Avenue.
• A mansion along Kalamansi street in Juna Subdivision, just a stone’s throw away from the grander mansion of his father, Andal Sr.
• At least 14 houses and lots distributed throughout Davao City: Nova Tierra Subdivision, Robinsons Highlands, and Juna Subdivision.
• At least 13 houses and lots throughout Cotabato City, mostly in the San Isidro area.

“The panel contends that these undeclared values of real properties can neither be explained nor justified by the net or disposable income of respondent as derived from his Annual Income Tax Returns,” it said in its report.

Zaldy, said the panel, did not appear to have any other means of making a living aside from his salary as Regional Governor of the ARMM.

“The only business interest and financial connection that Zaldy Ampatuan declared was that of the Maguindanao Pawnshop owned by his spouse, Johaira ‘Bongbong’ Midtimbang Ampatuan,” it said.

As for Ampatuan Sr., the lifestyle check panel found that he had not even declared a single real property in Davao City and Cotabato City. And yet Davao City is home to possibly the largest mansion allegedly owned by Andal Sr., a multi-structure mansion that covers an entire block along Kasuy and Kalamansi streets in upscale Juna Subdivision.

The mansion remains unfinished, as parts of the stone and concrete fence had not yet been fully painted. But solar panels have already been installed on the roof, reportedly in order to power water heaters for an indoor swimming pool. That mansion was raided by operatives of the National Bureau of Investigation backed up by army armored personnel carriers in December 2009, when the government was still looking for firearms owned by the Ampatuans. That lot covers 4,105 square meters in a residential neighborhood.

Other real properties allegedly owned by Andal Sr. include:

• Various properties in Davao City, including several parcels of land in Juna Subdivision, Marfori Heights, and Matina Crossing.
• Various properties in Cotabato City, notably in Moreno Subdivision, Kakar, and Rosary Heights.
• Various properties in Shariff Aguak, including the mansion along the national highway near the capitol. The compound of the mansion is so large that it also houses Andal Sr.’s personal mosque.

The panel noted that Andal Sr. had no visible means of livelihood other than a farm he had declared in his SALNs, which earned him “a farm business income of less than P200,000” from 2001 to 2002. Nevertheless, it said that Andal Sr.’s income surged to P1,558,220.60 in 2003, “eight times higher than the previous year’s amount.”

“This sudden surge in income is highly questionable considering that the only declared business of Andal S. Ampatuan Sr. was his farm business,” the lifestyle check panel reported. – PCIJ, November 2011

JUST A few weeks after the Nov. 23, 2009 Maguindanao Massacre, where 58 people including 32 journalists were executed in a remote barangay in Ampatuan town, officials of the Firearms and Explosives Division (FED) of the Philippine National Police (PNP) were surprised to receive a deluge of applications for gun amnesty from one particular province in Mindanao.

Every once in a while, the national government offers a gun amnesty to the general public. These amnesty offers are a general pardon of sorts, where people with loose or unlicensed firearms are allowed to have illegal guns licensed and registered in their names.

But this batch of applications raised a red flag among officials of the PNP-FED, the agency tasked with regulating gun ownership and use in the country.

First of all, almost all the new applications originated from Maguindanao province, where the massacre occurred.

Secondly, the applicants were mostly members of the local civilian volunteer organizations, or CVOs, the local militia. Interestingly, members of Maguindanao’s CVOs who owed loyalty to the Ampatuan clan, had been implicated in the massacre.

Third, many of the firearms were the highly-priced Bushmaster M4A3, a variant of the M4 carbine used by many special forces units. Just a few years earlier, the Ampatuan clan, through the Maguindanao provincial government, had purchased 50 Bushmasters through gun trader Crisostomo Aquino, allegedly to fight the terrorist threat in the province. The end users of the Bushmasters, priced at P120,000 each, were supposed to be members of the Maguindanao PNP.

Sr. Superintendent Danilo Maligalig, then operations chief of the PNP-FED, recalls that this batch of amnesty applications, “numbering around a hundred,” immediately caught the attention of firearms regulators.

The gun amnesty, provided for through Executive Order 817 signed by then President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo in June 2009 as part of the National Firearms Control Program (NFCP), had expired on Nov. 30, 2009, or a few days before this batch of amnesty applications swamped the FED.

From cops to CVOs

“Sinubukan nilang ipahabol ang mga ito (They tried to get this past us),” Maligalig recalls.

Maligalig says investigation by the FED later showed that these firearms were the same guns issued to the Maguindanao PNP to fight the rebel Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and other armed groups in the region.

But police officials were puzzled how these firearms found their way to the CVOs, who then tried to acquire legal possession of them through the firearms amnesty program. What made the applications all the more unusual was the fact that the guns had never even been declared lost by the local PNP in the first place.

To Maligalig and other FED officials, this much was clear: firearms meant for the government arsenals had found their way to armed groups loyal to the Ampatuans.

Too, the clan appeared to be scrambling to save its arsenal and retain its armed might in the wake of the government crackdown against the firepower of the Ampatuans.

But more importantly, it was an sign of how the Ampatuan clan, like other well-armed political families, may have mastered the art of finding and taking advantage of apparent loopholes in firearms laws and amnesty programs in order to build, arm, and maintain a parallel arsenal that rivals even that of the national government’s.

At the same time, it put into question the entire firearms regulation system, including the fact that some state agencies such as the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) deem themselves exempt from such rules.

Alarming findings

Maligalig says that FED officials immediately suspended that batch of firearms amnesty applications while a probe was underway.

The results of the probe were alarming.

Maligalig, who acted as vice chairman of the investigating committee formed by the FED, said they found that many of the firearms bought with government funds supposedly for the local PNP were really meant to be used by the Ampatuan militia.

Under PNP rules, local governments may purchase firearms for the use of the local police force. These purchases are, however, covered by an end-user certificate, which specifies who is the firearm’s real user. In the case of the Bushmaster carbines, the guns were supposed to go straight to police officers assigned in Maguindanao.

“The guns were meant for the local police of Maguindanao, in fact the memorandum receipts (MR) were in the name of the policemen assigned,” says Maligalig. “Pero pirma lang ‘yun (But these were just signatures on paper.) The actual distribution of the guns was made to the militia members.”

He says that a closer scrutiny of the firearms applications showed that some of the CVO members applying for gun amnesty were in fact implicated in the Maguindanao Massacre itself.

Wanted-list pics

“If you look at the pictures on the wanted list,” says Maligalig, “these were the same pictures in the amnesty applications application.”

A number of these CVO members were later arrested and have been included in the Maguindanao Massacre case now pending before the Quezon City Regional Trial Court.

Maligalig says it appeared that the clan had ordered militia members to have these high-powered firearms placed under the amnesty program, in order to spare them from confiscation by the government.

“When things got hairy, they (the Ampatuans) attempted to have their firearms placed under the amnesty program,” Maligalig tells the PCIJ. “Pinangalan lang ang mga baril sa mga militia (They just tried to have the guns registered in the name of their milita members).”

In all, some 1,200 firearms were reported by the AFP to have been unearthed, confiscated, or recovered in Maguindanao province following the Maguindanao Massacre, according to AFP spokesmen in 2010.

Most of these firearms were old and obsolete firearms usually issued to members of the Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUs) and CVOs, the so-called force multipliers authorized through Executive Order 546 signed by then President Gloria Arroyo in July 2006.

High-powered metal

A number of these recovered firearms, however, are clearly high-powered and high-end. Among the firearms recovered, as listed by the Mindanao-based news cooperative Mindanews, were:

• Four 60-mm mortars with ammunition;
• Two 81mm mortars;
• A 90mm recoilless rifle (actually a misnomer. The recoilless rifle fires a shaped charge that can punch a hole through armored vehicles);
• A 57-mm recoilless rifle;
• One Barrett sniper rifle (a specialized sniper weapon that delivers a half-inch slug with an effective range of 1.8 kilometers. The model recovered was a civilian version, although Barrett sniper rifles are normally not sold to private individuals but only to governments);
• Three M60 light machine guns (the standard machine gun of the AFP and the PNP);
• One .50 caliber heavy machine gun, also capable of punching holes in armored vehicles; and
• Various high-powered rifles and hand guns

Of these firearms, some 300 guns were turned over to the PNP Region 12 crime laboratory in General Santos City on suspicion that they were directly involved in the Maguindanao Massacre. So far, four of these confiscated guns have already been matched with slugs recovered from the victims and the site, according to Task Force Maguindanao head Chief Superintendent Benito Estipona. It is not clear if any of these firearms were part of the batch that CVOs tried to have registered under the amnesty program.

One long, one short

As a general rule, the country’s laws regulating firearms ownership limits the number of firearms owned by private citizens to “one long, one short,” or one rifle and one pistol.

In addition, private citizens are only allowed to own bolt-action or semi-automatic rifles with caliber no larger than .22 of an inch. The usual exemption is for gun club members, who are allowed a maximum of 10 rifles, but only “for sporting use.”

Yet according to the findings of the lifestyle check conducted by Deputy Ombudsman Humphrey Monteroso on the Ampatuan assets and submitted by the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC) to the Court of Appeals, the Ampatuan clan has at least 157 firearms of various calibers registered in the PNP-FED’s Firearms Identification Management System (FIMS) masterfile.

Of these 157 registered firearms, 23 are listed under the name of Andal Salibo Ampatuan Sr., and 26 under the name of Zaldy Uy Ampatuan. Eighteen guns are registered under the name of Andal Uy Ampatuan Jr., while another 15 are registered in the name of his brother Anwar.

(An earlier report by the PCIJ, quoting PNP-FED officials, pegged the number of firearms registered to members of the Ampatuan clan at 271, distributed among 103 persons with the surname Ampatuan.)

How then were the Ampatuans able to register so many firearms under their names?

Big cache of guns

Current officials of the PNP-FED refused repeated requests by the PCIJ for an interview. But Police Chief Superintendent Ricardo Marquez, executive officer of the Directorate for Investigation and Detective Management, says “the only way I can think of” how the clan was able to pull off such a feat is through the numerous amnesty programs offered over the years. This is because under the amnesty program, an applicant can register any number of firearms.

Marquez says even long firearms are included in the amnesty program. “The (limit) of only one-long, one-short is effectively overruled (by the amnesty),” he adds.

Since 1992, the government has offered at least 12 amnesty programs that would enable holders of loose firearms to have them registered and legalized for a fee.

But there is yet one more apparent loophole in the amnesty program that allows gun owners to collect and legally own high-powered firearms. Under the country’s gun laws, private citizens are not allowed to own high-powered rifles of 5.56 mm or 7.62 mm. These are the calibers of the standard M-16 rifle and the M1 Garand or the M14 rifle used by the police and the military.

The various amnesty programs, though, allow applicants to own high-powered rifles so long as they do not exceed 7.62mm. This means an applicant for amnesty can, once approved, legally own his own arsenal of high-powered firearms that are not available to ordinary citizens.

‘Designer guns’

A quick inspection of the list of firearms registered under the names of the Ampatuans, meantime, also reveals a proclivity, not just for high-powered firearms, but for “designer guns,” as described by one security consultant, as well.

Of the 23 firearms listed under his name, Andal Sr. owns an Israeli-made 5.56 Negev light machine gun, a belt-fed or drum-fed machine gun that is hardly for sporting use. The Israel Weapon Industries website describes the Negev as “a small, light weight advanced machine gun” that allows “accurate and fast controlled fire for close quarter battle or an automatic mode that allows maximum firepower.”

In addition, Andal Sr. owns a Heckler and Koch MP7 submachine gun, a new generation of submachine guns whose 4.6mm bullets can punch holes through bulletproof vests. Manufacturer Heckler and Koch’s official website describes the MP7’s ammunition as capable of penetrating a bulletproof vest “comprised of 1.6mm titanium plates and 20 layers of Kevlar, out to 200 meters and beyond.”

Andal Sr. also owns 18 pistols and three other high-powered rifles.

Not to be outdone, Zaldy Ampatuan owns a Negev light machinegun, two HK MP7 submachine guns, an HK UMP40 submachine gun, and two Israeli-made Tavor assault rifles, the same rifle now being issued to the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). This is aside from the 11 pistols and one shotgun that he owns.

Andal Jr., for his part, has 18 registered firearms, according to PNP records. These range from an OAR 556 rifle to a 5.7 caliber Fabrique Nationale submachine gun.

Expensive buys

A gun expert consulted by the PCIJ calls these “designer guns” that are very expensive, and hard to come by. An MP7 can be purchased in the Philippines for P 700,000 to P900,000 each because it is so rare, the expert says. The Tavor, with its bullpup design and built-in illuminated sights, can fetch anywhere from P600,000 to P700,000. A Negev light machinegun, because of its functionality, would be worth around P 1.2M in the Philippine market, he says.

In an email reply to PCIJ’s written queries, Andal Ampatuan Sr.’s lawyer, Sigfrid Fortun, dismisses suggestions that the Ampatuans had used the amnesty programs to build up their weapons arsenal.

“Whether they used the Amnesty Program to legitimize their possession of these weapons is arguable,” Fortun writes. “One thing is certain, though, when an unlicensed firearm is brought to the fold of the law and the PNP accepts it to license it, is this not far better than having loose firearms where the government does not even know exactly how many firearms one has in his possession? Now how can this submission to the fold of the law be immoral or illegal?”

Indeed, the argument is echoed by some police officials who see no problem with the liberal application of gun amnesty proclamations.

Marquez and Maligalig, for instance, both say it is better to encourage gun owners to have their loose firearms licensed, than to have these floating around unregistered.

Maligalig says the PNP-FED purposely made the amnesty proclamations more liberal “to ferret out” the loose firearms. He notes, “It was needed so that we could account all of those unrecorded.”

“The aim is to get the firearms registered, get their ballistic characteristics, and stencil them so that when they are used in a crime, they can be traced to their owners,” Marquez points out. “What’s the better situation, more guns that aren’t registered or have an amnesty program that has loose guns registered and stenciled?”

But he says there is an aspect of gun control that does need immediate attention. Over the years, he says, only civilians have been strictly following the letter of the law on firearms purchase and ownership. The likes of the AFP, effectively the biggest armed group in the country, apparently do not believe they have to follow such rules on firearms.

For example, Marquez says that firearms acquisitions made by AFP units outside of the regular arms dealers have largely been unregistered and unlicensed. Maligalig also says that AFP arms purchases go “undeclared.”

Floating around

For this reason, there are firearms floating around in the grey area between formal military units and the local government militias that the government has no records of. As such, it is much easier for high-powered firearms supposedly destined for the AFP to disappear into a black hole of sorts.

“When firearms are bought from a dealer, they are automatically registered,” says Marquez. “But when firearms are not acquired through that process, they are not registered. Some of the firearms of the AFP were through foreign military sales, so these were given directly to the AFP.”

“Our suggestion,” he says, “is for everybody’s firearms, especially government firearms, to be registered, and their records kept by the PNP, meaning ballistics records, stencils, etc.”

But the paperwork for such a process would probably have to compete with those from local officials who seem to believe they have to have a formidable arsenal in order to govern.

They fancied guns

Lawyer Fortun, for one, describes that the Ampatuans are “public officials who, during their incumbency, fancied guns (like most Alpha males). This was public knowledge.”

Yet he also defends the large number of firearms registered under the names of the Ampatuan family members by saying that the clan “was used by and had assisted the Government to fight the MILF.”

“Unsay (Andal Jr.) was in the forefront of these armed encounters,” Fortun says in his email reply to PCIJ’s queries. “They were the ‘stay-behind units’ ater the army completed its assault on known MILF territories. They took over and held the ground after the army had returned to their secure camps, and they kept the area they held MILF-free.”

According to Fortun, though, many of exotic firearms listed under the names of the Ampatuans were actually “gifts from constituents and others.”

Curiously, a PCIJ report on the guns of the Ampatuan clan published in 2010 also mentioned the fondness of some Ampatuan family members to give guns as gifts as well. Former Maguindanao Martial Law administrator Lt. Gen. Raymundo Ferrer had told the PCIJ that he had been offered one of the Tavor assault rifles of Zaldy Ampatuan as a gift a few weeks after the Maguindanao Massacre.

“Sir, kunin mo na lang, sa iyo na lang daw ang Tavor ni RG (Sir, just get it, RG’s Tavor is yours),” Ferrer recalls the aide of Zaldy as telling him over the phone.

On another occasion before the massacre, Ferrer recalled having received a brand new M4 assault rifle as a gift after a meeting with Zaldy Ampatuan. Ferrer said the gun was thrust on him by an Ampatuan aide while he was leaving.

A basic M4 assault rifle, without accessories, costs from $2,000 to 2,800 when purchased in bulk. – PCIJ, November 2011

In line with the activities leading up to the commemoration of Anti-Impunity Day, the Freedom Fund for Filipino Journalists (FFFJ) produced three short public service ads (PSAs) for free distribution to all media organizations and social networking sites. The PSAs are meant to remind everyone that impunity continues to be a problem in the Philippines, despite the change in the national leadership.

MAGUINDANAO:The Quest for Justice is a documentary produced by the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism on the second anniversary of the Maguindanao Massacre. After two years, the Ampatuans have allegedly ramped up efforts to reach a settlement with the families of the victims. The families of the victims continue to hold out against the proposed settlement, even as they try to survive from day to day. In the meantime, the Ampatuan clan continues to wield clout in the region with its vast resources and continuing political influence.

This is just the teaser. The entire video will be uploaded next month.