IT WOULD therefore seem that the winning formula is that of a popular candidate with a political machinery to ensure both media exposure and the logistics of a campaign But that is a no-brainer. Moreover, the insight doesn’t help in this election because so far none of the contenders can boast of that magic combination.

	Ballot boxes being readied for delivery: Nearly 40 million Filipinos are expected to cast their vote next year. [Photo courtesy of Malaya]

Arroyo and Lacson have the money and the machinery, but have been unable to capture the popular imagination in the same way that Estrada had. Meanwhile, the most popular of the declared contenders, Roco, has neither money nor machine. Pangan says that Aksyon Demokratiko is running a nontraditional campaign that relies less on logistics and more on people.

“How did we overcome Marcos? How did we overcome Erap?” he asks rhetorically, if a bit naively. “It’s not by machinery. We have to work on the people. You do a lot of organizing and educating work. You have to educate the youth that this election is theirs. They are the majority of the population. And you tell them, ‘It is in your hands. You have the power.’”

This sounds more like a line from the Keanu Reeves starrer, “The Matrix,” rather than of a campaign strategist talking. If Roco wins, it will signal a tectonic shift in the nature of Philippine politics. Despite the changes that have taken place since 1986, the last two elections were not a severance from the past but a continuation — with some surprising twists. In many respects, the way in which elections are fought remains unchanged. Before it was guns, goons, and gold. Today it is media, money, and machinery.

The realities of a national campaign require the ability to travel around the country and be visible, to buy advertising time, and to fund a nationwide network of campaigners and election watchers. A popular candidate, everyone agrees, has a decided advantage over an unpopular one, but he cannot last in a 90-day campaign without funds.

Even Pangan says that a serious contender needs at least P1 billion to run a decent campaign. Puno pegs the comfort zone at P2 billion. Maceda estimates though that the administration candidate needs to spend at least P5 billion, while the opposition traditionally spends less.

Media expenses account for a big slice of the total pie, as much as a third of the whole if promotional expenses like posters are included, says Banayo. By Maceda’s calculations, a moneyed candidate can spend P1 billion on media alone. The expenses are for both advertising (one senator has reportedly spent P50 million for a month’s worth of advertising) and positive coverage. As shown in a PCIJ study of the 1998 elections, candidates spent substantial amounts to get favorable media mileage, including paying off journalists and media agencies.

Traditionally, however, before media became so expensive and so important to a campaign, candidates spent half of their budget on election-day expenses. Banayo estimates that a candidate should spend P800 to P1,000 per precinct on election day, to include allowances, transportation, and meals for watchers. Given 200,000 polling precincts throughout the country, that’s P200 million. Puno’s estimate is that a candidate will pay one watcher per precinct on election day and at least three days afterward while the count is taking place, so that’s P100 million a day for four days.

On top of that, a candidate needs to build a network of supporters to campaign for him or her. Puno says he has built a network of local leaders at the town and barangay level. He has 400,000 names of such leaders in his database.

The other thing that all campaign strategists agree on is that, as Banayo puts it, “Political parties are irrelevant.” This is because a presidential aspirant needs to build his or her own political organization rather than rely on a political party to deliver the votes. In the end, as Mitra learned in 1992 and de Venecia in 1998, local politicians secure their own victory first and are quick to abandon their party’s presidential candidate, especially if these are unlikely to win.

In fact, says Puno, a party is a liability as it only increases the costs of a campaign: The presidential contender is expected to raise the money for the party as well. Congressmen, for example, expect to be bankrolled by the presidential candidate they are supporting. A congressman can expect at least P1 million, although more generous candidates can give up to P10 million for their favored representatives, says Puno.

But, as was evident in 1992 and 1998, such money can all be for naught. Mitra and de Venecia were lavish in the support they gave their congressional allies. But when the crunch came, the representatives didn’t deliver.

1998 Election Results

Rank	Candidate	Votes Received	% of Total Votes Received
1	ESTRADA, Joseph	10,722,295	39.50%
2	DE VENECIA, Jose	4,268,483	15.70%
3	ROCO, Raul	3,720,212	13.70%
4	OSMEÑA, Emilio	3,347,631	12.30%
5	LIM, Alfredo	2,344,362	8.60%
6	DE VILLA, Renato	1,308,352	4.80%
7	SANTIAGO, Miriam	797,206	2.90%
8	ENRILE, Juan Ponce	343,139	1.30%
9	MARCOS, Imelda	247,094	0.91%
10	DUMLAO, Santiago	32,212	0.12%
11	MORATO, Manuel	18,644	0.07%

Source: Comelec

1992 Election Results

Rank	Candidate	Votes Received	% of Total Votes Received
1	RAMOS, Fidel	5,342,521	23.60%
2	SANTIAGO, Miriam	4,468,173	19.70%
3	COJUANGCO, Eduardo	4,116,376	18.20%
4	MITRA, Ramon	3,316,661	14.60%
5	MARCOS, Imelda	2,338,294	10.30%
6	SALONGA, Jovito	2,302,123	10.20%
7	LAUREL, Salvador	770,046	3.40%

Source: Comelec

ONE OF the other things that are different in this election is that there are fewer contenders. There were seven in 1992 and 11 in 1998. So far, for 2004, there are only three. This should make for a saner election, if only because it will be easier for voters to focus on the relative merits of the candidates.

Puno hopes that in the end, given the more or less equal media exposure of the three contenders, the President’s superior organization and machinery will ensure her victory. Banayo is banking on the possibility that the current disenchantment with politicians will mobilize support for Lacson. Such support can in turn be translated into votes that will be cast and counted because the senator has a well-organized and well-funded machine. Roco, whose campaign organization is said to be in disarray and who is reportedly still starved of funds, is placing his bets on young, urban voters anxious for change.

Demography is on Roco’s side, but political culture and electoral tradition weigh heavily in Arroyo’s and Lacson’s favor.

For some time now, young voters have made up the bulk of the electorate. Today a little more than half of the more than 39 million voters are below 35, with a significant number of them aged 18 to 25. In all, two-thirds of the electorate is below 45.

At the same time, the 2000 census shows that 48 percent of Filipinos now live in urban areas, compared to 37.5 percent in 1980 and 32 percent in 1970. The latest National Statistics Office bulletin says that five of the top 10 vote-rich provinces are also the most urbanized in the country. Cavite and Laguna, for example, are now more than 80 percent urban.

The conventional wisdom is that young voters are less bound by traditional loyalties and more open to idealistic appeals of reform and good governance. These young voters are also mainly urban voters and avid media consumers. This means that they will likely not vote according to what their elders say. It is more likely they will be taking their cues from television.

But that is a double-edged sword. It is true that TV dumbs down and favors entertainment to education. Yet the audience has also become more discerning and critical. The attention span of viewers, as shown in the Estrada impeachment trial, is not quite that short either. Young viewers, being of the TV generation, are more selective about what they believe as well. They no longer lap up everything that’s on the tube; they are equally likely to be turned off.

Lacson’s Jose Pidal exposé, for example, eventually petered out, not only because he didn’t have sufficient evidence but also because the audience had grown both weary and wary of exposés. A similar fatigue was evident in the earlier attempts of Arroyo’s image makers to project her as a kinder, gentler president. The audience simply tuned out. They are not as easily manipulable as the PR people thought. Even the ratings of news programs that focused on Kris Aquino’s famous lover’s quarrel with comedian and mayor Joey Marquez dwindled after a while because the audience could only take so much.

Television as an arena of electoral battle, therefore, is a minefield. The old formulas no longer work. The audience is fickle, and the messages do not always come across as they were intended. This is why the terrain of 2004 is not as even or as predictable as the campaign strategists think.

For sure, all of them concede the importance of the so-called market vote. Banayo says that up to 75 percent of the electorate cannot be commanded by political leaders to vote as they are told. Puno puts the figure even higher at 80 percent. This is the highest it’s ever been. This makes the unpredictability factor very high indeed.