THE OTHER thing that all the campaign managers acknowledge is that there is now heightened popular disenchantment with politics and with politicians. They also sense a growing impatience with democratic institutions.

	Next year’s election will have many more young and urban voters than in the past. [Photo courtesy of Malaya]

The unstated fear, therefore, is that such disillusionment makes the electorate ripe for a populist messiah like action star Fernando Poe Jr. or an overpowering TV presence like news anchor and now Senator Noli de Castro. Perhaps realizing that their candidates cannot match the star appeal of these two celebrities, the campaigns so far have attempted to steer the 2004 discourse toward issues and the qualifications of the contenders.

“There has been, over the past five years, an increase in the sense of hopelessness of the public,” says Lito Banayo, Lacson’s spokesperson and a key member of the senator’s campaign organization. “Filipinos, given the depths of despair, of hopelessness that they have experienced through the years, will try to make a more intelligent choice this time.”

Ernesto Pangan, the chief operating officer of Roco’s Aksyon Demokratiko agrees: “Gulpi na ang mga tao (People feel battered already). There is a lot of cynicism (so) people will go by who is consistent, is at least telling the truth. Tama na ang bola-boladas (Enough of the crap), let’s go for who we know will give us a stable, honest, and sincere government.”

“People are saying that the government is hopeless,” agrees Puno. “By and large, these people are thinking. You put in the bells and whistles, but what if they think? What if they’re thoughtful about the issues? You’re dead if you’re not ready.”

In a sense, all three know where their candidates strengths are — which most certainly are not in the realm of Puno’s “bells and whistles” or what Pangan calls “media gimmickry.” So by directing the electorate’s attention to more substantive issues, they hope their candidates will benefit. Thus far, it has been in everyone’s interest to have an intelligent campaign, and if only for this reason, the elections next year could see a higher level of political debate than in the past.

At the same time, campaign strategists realize they have to address the prevailing disillusionment. This is why all three candidates are trying to present a reformist image. Lacson is projecting himself as an anti-crime and anti-corruption crusader. He has spoken out against pork barrel funds and his campaign slogan is, “Huwag matakot! Walang kurakot!”

Roco is putting forward a case for new politics, appealing to youth and women’s causes. He is picky about campaign contributors, publicly declaring that he will not take money from drugs or jueteng. He is also consciously taking the moral high ground on issues like the impeachment of Chief Justice Hilario Davide Jr.

Arroyo is endorsing charter change, in an effort to show that she stands not just for a continuation of things past but also for overhauling what is widely acknowledged to be a failing political system. Says Puno: “Gloria is starting to talk about constitutional change. I think she recognizes that people no longer see that there’s hope in the system, so you have to open a valve and say, let’s change it.”

ONE OF the campaign people interviewed for this issue thinks their candidate can win through money and machine alone. They have learned their lessons from 1992 and 1998.

In 1992, House Speaker Ramon V. Mitra had a fat war chest, the formidable reach of the ruling Lakas party, and the backing of the majority of congressmen. But he was trounced, landing a humiliating fourth in a field of seven contenders.

Miriam Defensor-Santiago, a former judge and the erstwhile immigration commissioner, was a close second, thanks to colorful sound bites and deliberate self-projection as a no-nonsense anti-corruption crusader. Santiago had neither political party nor substantial amounts of campaign money (at least until the last stretch of the campaign). Yet she came less than 900,000 votes shy of the presidency.

The winner, Fidel V. Ramos, had administration support in terms of funds and personnel and a campaign organization made up of political mechanics with well-honed killer instincts. But he became president only through the skin of his teeth.

Vote-Rich Provinces, as of July 4, 2002

Rank	Province	Total No. of Registered Voters	Percentage
	PHILIPPINES	37,900,176
	NCR	5,267,732	13.90%
1	Cebu	1,706,970	4.50%
2	Negros Occidental	1,250,266	3.30%
3	Pangasinan	1,196,318	3.20%
4	Bulacan	1,129,857	2.90%
5	Cavite	1,056,015	2.80%
6	Laguna	1,010,951	2.70%
7	Iloilo	990,123	2.60%
8	Batangas	979,632	2.60%
9	Davao del Sur	959,634	2.50%
10	Pampanga	896,506	2.40%

Source: Election and Barangay Affairs Department (EBAD), Comelec

That election, however, reaffirmed the strength of regional and linguistic loyalties. Pangasinan, the province with one of the biggest number of votes, made up nearly 10 percent of native son Ramos’s total tally, while the Ilonggo-speaking provinces delivered for Santiago.

But the limits of the native-son approach to vote getting were made obvious in 1998, when Joseph Estrada enjoyed wide margins throughout the country, even in the regional bailiwicks of his rivals. The lesson perhaps is that, in a close election, the margin could be swung in favor of the likes of Ramos and Santiago with strong regional and linguistic bases.

In 1998, when there was overwhelming support for Estrada, who received 40 percent of the votes in a field of 11 contenders, it became obvious that the regional vote could not overcome the weaknesses of rival candidates. Still, there was residual support for native sons, as shown in the respectable numbers received by House Speaker Jose de Venecia in vote-rich Pangasinan, Roco in his native Bicol, and Emilio ‘Lito’ Osmena in the Cebuano-speaking provinces.

What was thus evident in 1998 was that class loyalties could overcome regional and linguistic ones. Estrada, after all, was from San Juan, Metro Manila and did not boast of any major local bailiwick. But his masa appeal more than made up for this. At the same time, he had a well-funded election machine (reportedly P1 billion from tobacco tycoon Lucio Tan alone).

Moreover, Estrada’s political network was nothing to be scoffed at. Eduardo ‘Danding’ Cojuangco’s Nationalist People’s Coalition mobilized its resources for his candidacy, as did LDP stalwarts Ronaldo Zamora and Edgardo Angara. In addition, local political families like the Singsons of Ilocos Sur, the Dys of Isabela, the Josons of Nueva Ecija, the Dutertes of Davao City, and the Emanos of Misamis Oriental delivered the vote for the popular movie star. This meant that on the ground, Erap could match man for man the organizational clout of a well-funded opponent like de Venecia, who came a far second (the difference was 3.5 million votes). Like de Venecia, Estrada’s campaign machinery had local leaders — governors, mayors, and barangay captains — working for his victory. The difference was de Venecia had neither Erap’s popularity nor his charisma.