THE CAMPAIGN

First-World Techniques, Third-World Setting

The X-Men: The Story of Activists-Turned-Political Consultants

With a Little Help from (U.S.) Friends

Campaigning, Filipino Style

Spinning the News

Campaigns on the High-Tech Road

Songs in the Key of Politics

PHOTO ESSAY

The Presidency as Image

ELECTION PERSPECTIVES

Elections are like Water

The Enigma of the Popular Will

VOTER'S VOICE

First-time Voter

Regular Voter

Non-Voter

Hope and Elections in Payatas

THE LIGHTER SIDE

Making (Non)Sense of Politics

Election Lexicon

Quickie Quiz for the Politically Insane

PERHAPS it would be less discombobulating and easier for others to take Philippine politics seriously if they looked at it in the context of Southeast Asia. For sure, we stand out like a sore thumb from the two other democracies in the region — Thailand and Indonesia. Then again, the challenges that face our political system may not necessarily be more serious, just different.

In Indonesia, the biggest challenge is coherence. The fall of Soeharto has seen the rise of centrifugal forces challenging the unity of the Indonesian polity. The insurgency in Aceh as well as the outbreaks of sectarian violence in places like Maluku are indicative of the forces that are let loose when the strong hand of the state is relaxed. Indonesians are frustrated with the weak and feckless leadership of President Megawati Soekarnoputri, who has had to lean heavily on the military. Like the Philippines, post-Soeharto Indonesia is weighed down by the problems of corruption, economic decline, a politicized military, and popular expectations raised by the introduction of democracy.

The politics of Indonesia, which is also holding presidential elections in May, is as corrupt, factionalized, and as personalistic as ours. The problems of holding together a vast archipelago of 200 million people are also more formidable than ours. The gaps in wealth, however, are not as yawning as ours. Yet, as in the Philippines, Indonesian democracy has so far proved resilient, able to contain myriad challenges even if it remains imperfect, elitist, and unresponsive to the needs of the poor majority.

In Thailand, the challenge is a creeping authoritarianism posed by the strong leadership of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, a telecommunications tycoon who runs the country like the imperious CEO of a big company. Thaksin has no patience for human rights, a free press, and the other niceties of democracy. While he has been able to provide much needed leadership to post-crisis Thailand, he is also challenging the dearly won political freedoms that Thais have enjoyed since 1992. Thaksin is introducing to Thailand a kind of politics that is closer to that of Lee Kuan Yew-era Singapore and Mahathir-era Malaysia. The middle class and NGOs are kicking and screaming, but so far Thaksin has managed to get popular support for his strong-arm measures. Many therefore see dark clouds hanging over Thai democracy, which they fear may morph into an authoritarian deviant, putting an end to what was until recently seen as the most successful democratic experiment in Southeast Asia.

The problems facing the Philippines therefore are by no means unusual. Elsewhere in Southeast Asia, democracy is being put to the test. The Philippines is just differently challenged. It is also that our politics give far more space to the entertaining and the idiotic. Filipinos show more tolerance for the quirkiest forms of political lowlife — why else would a toupéed crackpot and conman like Eddie Gil be in the presidential race? The other difference of course is that, unlike Thailand and Indonesia, we have been holding elections for over 100 years now. And we still haven't got it right.

The reason is not because we don't know any better. The leaders of the mainstream political parties now realize that the system that has so far worked so well for them is showing very big cracks. Their place in the firmament is no longer secure: They risk being displaced by the real stars.

As the 2004 elections approached, it became apparent that the professional politicians stood no chance against celebrities especially in the national races. Politicians were coming to the realization that if only for self-preservation, the system had to be changed.

In the political summit held in 2002, the biggest political parties, including the ruling Lakas-Christian Muslim Democrats and the National People's Coalition, agreed on the urgency of legislating political and electoral reforms. They also reached a consensus that strong, stable parties were the solution to what seemed to be the inevitable dominance of Philippine politics by celebrities.

In the succeeding months, several bills on political reforms were filed, including those that would regulate campaign finance, provide subsides to political parties, and enact other provisions to establish a stable party system. Some NGOs and party-list groups were enthusiastic about the measures and so took active part in the drafting and in the committee deliberations. Speaker Jose de Venecia himself lent full support for the reforms. The various proposals were consolidated, and by early 2003, a bill on party development and campaign finance was being discussed in both Houses.

Eventually, however, the proponents of party reform realized that the committee deliberations at the House were focused more on subsidies that would be provided for political parties. Senators were more enthusiastic about other provisions like party discipline and transparency in campaign contributions. These were written into the bill, thanks in part to the advocacy of NGO lobbyists.

Still the House had to be appeased with long discussions on the formula for computing the subsidies, how much would be made available from government coffers, and which parties would get them. At the House, the bill was referred to the appropriations committee, where the chair, Rolando Andaya Jr., said that as much as P300 million could be sourced from state funds to subsidize political parties. But Andaya appeared reluctant to ensure that the funds could be made available for the 2004 elections.

In January 2004, the House approved the bill on third and final reading, but the Senate, which was derailed by investigations into all sorts of charges and the controversy over the questionable citizenship of presidential contender Fernando Poe Jr., failed to pass the bill by the time Congress closed in February.

Surprisingly, some of the most contentious provisions — the ban on party switching and stiff penalties for turncoatism — were approved. This was because the leaders of the major parties were themselves concerned about the defections from their ranks, especially as the May elections neared. The opportunism that was previously tolerated was now seriously impairing the cohesion of such parties as Lakas and the NPC. Party leaders saw that the old system was undermining their interests. Yet, precisely because party discipline was weak, they could not get the bill passed speedily, even though it had been certified as urgent by the administration.