THE DIVIDED FRONT
The post-1986 political consensus is now under unprecedented strain. Weakened by internal wranglings, the once united front of the ruling elites is crumbling quickly. With very little economic progress to show for the past two decades, the government is finding it difficult to exact consent from the middle and lower classes. It is in this larger context that the current political crisis is unfolding.

Beneath the confusing web of coalitions and alliances among powerful families, politicians, military factions, religious groups, and civil-society organizations, the fundamental political division in the Philippines today remains that between those who want to preserve their position of dominance in society and those who want to dislodge them. Overlaid on this polarization is the divergence between those who want to salvage the post-1986 system and those who want to dismantle it.

The problem for the preservationist camp, however, is that its proposed solutions to the current crisis have all been dead ends.

To deflect calls for her ouster, Arroyo has been pushing for constitutional revisions that, among other recommendations, would change the government from a presidential to a parliamentary system, which critics argue could be even more easily manipulated by the elite. The ruling class has been concerned by the power that direct presidential elections gives to the masses, as demonstrated by the election of Estrada — who, while a member of the ruling class himself, appealed to the poor by stoking their class resentments and notably was not anointed by traditional elites.

The constitutional solution Arroyo proposes has not gained political traction, however, and is unlikely to overcome formidable opposition. Faced with threats both from other elite factions and from the left, Arroyo has resorted to authoritarian measures, further undermining the post-1986 system of “limited democracy.” The reimposition of what amounted to martial law by the recent declaration of a “state of emergency” and other authoritarian proclamations signal the willingness of Arroyo’s government to resort to force when all else fails.

The anti-Arroyo factions that also strive to salvage the current political order have likewise shot only blanks. Drawing its constituency from rightists and centrists, and those leaning center-left, this motley political grouping is represented by the Aquinos, the Catholic hierarchy, and the business class, as well as social liberals and democrats.

Most of them have come together under the banner of the so-called Black and White Movement. At first, they pushed for strict adherence to the constitutional order and initially called for the succession of Vice President Noli de Castro to the presidency. But this has since been abandoned because de Castro still supports Arroyo, and even people from within their ranks see him as too lightweight to safeguard their interests competently.

They later supported last year’s impeachment proceedings against the president. After that move was blocked by pro-Arroyo legislators, who still dominate Congress, some of them began pushing for special elections — in short, a continuation of the post-1986 system of electoral democracy, although without Arroyo at the helm.

SEEKING TOTAL CHANGE
This is yet another point of divergence they have from those who seek to dismantle the system altogether. Though members of this group have different motivations, tactics, and political alternatives, they have come around to a common conclusion: their solutions would require an extraconstitutional intervention and would not be bound by the parameters of the post-1986 political system.

But this group is a virtual spectrum in which on one end are those who feel that so-called “limited democracy” cannot be relied on to preserve order; its openness has only been exploited by so-called “communists” and by corrupt elites. This camp includes rightist civilian and military factions who want to establish a military or civilian-military junta, as well as factions inside the Arroyo government who are advocating repressive measures beyond those formally allowed under so-called “low-intensity” democracy.

Yet another point on this continuum though is the tactical alliance among elite anti-Arroyo opposition groups, most of them right-wing groups linked to Estrada, but also including well-known personalities with leftist backgrounds, some associated with the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP). Grouped under the Solidarity Movement, they are calling for a “transitional council” that will presumably be composed of opposition politicians and some leaders of the party.

The politicians apparently see this as a way to regain power and restore elite democracy under their command. The CPP, for its part, presumably sees this as a chance to infiltrate the highest echelons of the state, even as it continues to implement its military strategy of encircling cities from the countryside and seizing power through armed insurrection.

Another section under the left’s banner is the Laban ng Masa (Fight of the Masses) coalition. They are calling for a “transitional revolutionary government” (TRG) — without conservative elite forces represented in the leadership. This umbrella coalition brings together a diverse group of leftist political forces: Leninists together with autonomous social movements and nongovernmental organizations, Maoists together with Left-party formations that do not see the seizure of the state as the priority, socialists, left-liberals, greens, and others.

Most of the political blocs included here broke away from the CPP in the 1990s, and the coalition is the highest level of tactical and political unity they have achieved since then.

According to the coalition, the TRG’s aim is to institute economic and political changes that have so far been resisted by the elites, such as land reform and the reversal of neo-liberal economic policies such as privatization and free trade. Elections will then resume once their conditions are met.

“AMERICAN APPROVAL”
As different groups and factions scramble for power, the U.S. Embassy has become a very popular destination. “What everyone is trying to do,” confided one of the cabinet secretaries who recently resigned and joined the anti-Arroyo movement, “is to get American approval.” Even the government has no illusions as to what the embassy can do: Last year, the president’s then chief of staff Rigoberto Tiglao was quoted by the New York Times as saying, “If the Americans decide to drop support of the Philippine president, it crumbles.”

That has been borne out historically. The Philippines may have ceased to being a U.S. colony in 1946, but Washington has continued to intervene politically by financing preferred candidates and groups, conducting widespread covert operations, and helping to stage-manage elections.

In 1950, a U.S. National Security Council document stated that among the United States’ goals in the country was the maintenance of “an effective government which will preserve and strengthen the pro-U.S. orientation”. In 1972, Washington supported the declaration of martial law because, as a U.S. Senate report put it, “military bases and a familiar government in the Philippines are more important than the preservation of democratic institutions.”

When Marcos finally became more of a political liability than an asset to the United States, Washington immediately transferred its support to the anti-Marcos elite factions, attempted to unify them, and ensured that they would call the shots in the anti-dictatorship movement.