ZUCE’S MINDANAO TRIPS
On August 10, Capt. Marlon Mendoza, a former Intelligence Service officer assigned as Garcillano’s chief security officer during the polls, surfaced to say he flew to Mindanao on May 11, 2004 on Garcillano’s order, and accompanied Zuce when the latter visited Lanao del Norte and Cotabato City. Mendoza told the Senate he saw Zuce handing Lanao provincial election supervisor Ray Sumalipao a “large amount of cash in an envelope” on May 12. A Comelec director in Cotabato City also received cash from Zuce on May 14, he said.

Mendoza said that by May 16, he and Zuce were in Iligan City. As their group was having lunch in a restaurant there, he heard someone say, “Huling binibilang ang balota sa area ng Lanao del Norte at Lanao del Sur para makakuha ng dagdag (The ballots from Lanao del Norte and Lanao del Sur will be the last to be counted so we can increase these) if GMA will lose in other areas in the country.”

In a recorded May 29 conversation with Garcillano, the president had asked pointedly, “So will I still lead by more than one million (votes)?” The commissioner replied that her rival’s count was high but “mag-compensate man po sa Lanao ‘yan (that will be compensated in Lanao).” At the time, the counting of votes from seven towns in Lanao del Sur’s 39 provinces was far from over.

Zuce says his uncle sent him to Mindanao to coordinate with the Comelec personnel there. He says the region’s “special operations” headed by Ernesto ‘Butch’ Paquingan, a political consultant based in Cagayan de Oro City, helped in ensuring Arroyo’s victory. Zuce says Paquingan was reporting directly to then Executive Secretary Romulo. Paquingan has called Zuce a liar. Zuce, he added, told him the opposition had offered him P4 million to P5 million to testify against Arroyo.

But an old hand in electoral campaigns says Zuce worked with Paquingan in previous polls, including the 1998 elections. Many candidates for national position also engaged Paquingan’s services to help them win in Mindanao, says the campaign veteran.

In his Senate testimony, Mendoza said Garcillano sent him to Cagayan de Oro on May 11, 2004 as security officer for Zuce, Paquingan, “King James,” and a certain “Jun L. Bamboo” of the Presidential Management Services. He identifi ed Paquingan as “a consultant related to DFA Secretary Romulo” and “King James” as George Goking, whom he said was Arroyo’s close friend.

In the “Hello, Garci” tapes, there are two recorded conversations between the Comelec commissioner and Zuce. The first was on May 28, 2004 when Garcillano asked Zuce and Goking, a Cagayan de Oro businessman who is also a director of the Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (Pagcor), to come to his house for a meeting. Zuce, who confirmed to the Senate that he was among those recorded in the “Hello, Garci” tapes, called the commissioner again on June 16 to say he and “George” (apparently Goking) were at Harrison Plaza. In both conversations, Zuce addressed Garcillano as “’cle,” short for uncle.

The campaign veteran says Mindanao is home to many freelance operators, including businessmen, who help candidates by buying votes for them. Zuce had been Garcillano’s conduit to some of these key players, according to the source.

“(The operators) join Senate party coalitions if not hired by a senatorial candidate,” says the campaign expert. “Then they moonlight toward the fi nish line either buying votes or doing presidential campaigns. After the campaign, they are hired as political officers.”

The campaign veteran says the operators have long been in existence; all a candidate has to do is tap into the existing syndicates and networks.

“OPLAN MERCURY”
Businessman Rodolfo Galang, however, says it is also important to ensure the “cooperation” of local officials and political rivals for a candidate to win. Galang says he volunteered to do this for the president in parts of Mindanao during the 2004 elections.

Galang, who co-owns a banana chips processing plant in Maguindanao with Paulino Ejercito, brother of ousted President Estrada, says he decided to help the Arroyo camp because he believed the country would not benefit from a Poe presidency. Galang had also been eyeing a slot machine franchise from the Pagcor. He never got it.

Soon after the polls, Galang changed his mind about Arroyo and executed on June 21, 2004 an affidavit he later filed with the Office of the Ombudsman. His affidavit charged the Arroyo administration with buying off local officials and opposition candidates in Romblon and certain areas in Mindanao under “Oplan Mercury.” These were Lanao del Sur, Davao City, Davao del Norte, Maguindanao, Cotabato City, Davao Oriental, South Cotabato, Davao del Sur, Sulu, North Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Tawi-Tawi, Samal, Compostela, Sarangani, Zamboanga Sibugay, and Bukidnon.

Galang says his conduit to the president was Limcaoco. A March 28, 2004 memorandum for Arroyo purportedly coursed through Limcaoco identifi ed the political leaders who Galang said he could convince to pledge their support for the president, paving the way for the conversion of about a third of Poe’s projected votes to Arroyo’s. He estimated this roughly to be 1.6 million of the 5.5 million votes in the “Mercury” areas.

The “conversion,” according to Galang, could be made by using the carrot of fund releases to convince local government officials to mobilize support for Arroyo. Thus, in his affidavit, Galang implicated the officials who made those fund releases possible: Nena Valdez, the president’s former Assumption Convent classmate who reportedly took charge of the funds released for Oplan Mercury; then Agriculture Secretary Luis Lorenzo for approving the release of the fertilizers given to Mindanao officials; then National Food Authority director Arthur Yap for the rice distributed to them; Pagcor chair Ephraim Genuino for the capital equipment that was also given out; and then Health Secretary Manuel Dayrit for the medicine. (See “Running on Taxpayer’s Money.”)

Before the March 2004 memo, Galang says he submitted to the president, again through Limcaoco, analyses of the political situation these places, including informal surveys assessing the chances of Arroyo and local candidates. The document on Maguindanao projected Poe would win 70 percent of the votes, or about 284,310. “Oplan Mercury” would pad the votes to ensure that Arroyo got 262,2440, leaving Poe with only 43,740 votes. (PCIJ has copies of the Maguindanao document and the March 2004 memo.)

Right after Galang disclosed “Oplan Mercury” in a press conference last year, Limcaoco dismissed his allegations as hearsay and baseless. He said Galang had volunteered to campaign for K-4 but “he was never my employee or political operator. Nor did we authorize or support any illegal operation.”

Former Cabinet members say it was unlikely Limcaoco had time to mount such an operation. They say taking care of the K-4 senatorial candidates was a full-time job.

Still, the president did post one of her biggest winning margins in the congressional count for Maguindanao, garnering 193,938 votes against Poe’s 59,892. The opposition considers the outcomes in eight towns there as highly dubious. Poe scored zero in Ampatuan and Datu Piang, and got as little as five to 174 votes in six other towns.

In their June 6 conversation, the president sought Garcillano’s assurance that the documents in Maguindanao were consistent. The commissioner had replied that Maguindanao wasn’t really much of a problem.

Four days later, Arroyo expressed concern over the local canvassing in South Upi town, where Comelec had proclaimed different winners. But she told Garcillano that the important thing was “hindi madamay ‘yung sa taas (we don’t get affected at the top).” The commissioner assured her that he had control there.