THE FULL RANGE OF OPERATIONS'

	BALIKATAN 2002. U.S. and Philippine forces engaged in combat training. [photo courtesy of LCpl. Shane A. Austin, USMC]

In denying that U.S. troops are engaged in "actual combat" in the Philippines, U.S. and Philippine officials have sought to reduce the coverage of the definition of the phrase to only those actions that involve the direct application of force. This implies that U.S. troops could be considered as engaging in combat only when they themselves personally pull the trigger and fire guns at their enemies. Yet while U.S. troops have actually found themselves in this position, U.S. public information officers continue to stress that their actions are confined to performing "non-combat" roles, such as training or undertaking humanitarian missions.

But even as U.S. and Filipino officials take pains to publicly draw distinctions between U.S. troops' missions, the U.S. military apparently does not. As its own Army Field Manual states, "Military power is not limited to acts of violence and overt hostilities to achieve strategic objectives." This view, says the manual, is particularly valid for U.S. Special Operations Forces. It adds, "The principles of war apply to the full range of operations, specifically where the use of force is more selective and where restraint and nonlethal aspects of power are dominant."

The U.S. military also defines "civil-military operations" or CMOs, including the construction of deep wells, roads, and school buildings, as well as medical and dental missions as a "group of planned activities in support of military operations that enhance the relationship between the military forces and civilian authorities and population and which promote the development of favorable emotions, attitudes, or behavior in neutral, friendly, or hostile grounds." Testifying about their CMOs in Basilan, former U.S. Pacific Command chief Admiral Thomas Fargo said these "acted as force multipliers for U.S. and AFP operations because the programs separated the citizens of Basilan from supporting the terrorist threat."

The goal is not just to earn the locals' sympathy, but also to extract information necessary for combat. As one military writer pointed out, the humanitarian projects' underlying aim is "not simply to provide feel-good projects that achieve positive perceptions among the local populace." He added, "The purpose is to utilize the correct… carrots… that will yield actionable intelligence that can be used to target and destroy the insurgent infrastructure…"

After the carrots come the sticks. Or as Wendt put it: "After the infrastructure has been identified and exposed by the local population, its members can be killed or captured."

Even infrastructure projects — the extension of airport runways, construction of piers and jetties, road-paving, and so on — which have won over many local authorities have larger military goals. Pointing out how they enabled troops to move around more quickly, Walley says these projects "benefited U.S. trainers and advisers and contributed to force protection." They are also useful for meeting the troops' supply and logistics needs. Likewise, training AFP troops serves U.S. combat-related goals. In U.S. military terminology, indigenous troops act as "force multipliers" in projecting power and in achieving U.S. military objectives but — as the Army Field Manual says — "with minimum visibility, risk, and cost." To put it another way, AFP members are trained so they can be put out front and first in line when the enemies start firing.

'LONG-TERM LOw-VISIBILITY PRESENCE'

Rather than just lone-standing missions, the U.S. troops' actions in the Philippines are part of a comprehensive and wide-ranging transformation of the U.S. military organization and its global posture. In fact, their interrelated missions conform to the overall U.S. military strategy, as articulated in various official documents, including the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the National Security Strategy (NSS), the National Military Strategy (NDS), the National Defense Strategy (NDS), and the National Strategy to Combat Terrorism (NSCT), among others.

At one level, the deployment of troops in the Philippines is in keeping with Washington's determination to "focus decisive military power and specialized intelligence resources to defeat terrorist networks globally." This is because the challenge to U.S. interests, as seen by U.S. strategists, no longer comes just from state but also non-state actors, especially those taking shelter in states incapable of controlling their own territory. Says the NSS: "America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones."

This "failing state" label has been increasingly pinned on the Philippines, with former U.S. embassy officials describing Mindanao as "a doormat for terrorism in the region" or as the "next Afghanistan." Faced with these kinds of threats, the NSS asserts, "The fight must be taken to the enemy, to keep them on the run." In this fight, the lines between a defensive war and what the Supreme Court terms "offensive war" are blurred, if not indeterminate. For as the NSCT points out, "[T]he best defense is a good offense."

As a result, the QDR calls for a shift in emphasis "from conducting war against nations — to conducting war in countries we are not at war with" — a category that fits the Philippines. U.S. journalist Seymour Hersh has written about a presidential order that allows the Pentagon "to operate unilaterally in a number of countries where there is a perception of a clear and evident terrorist threat." He didn't name the countries, but the description of some of them again covers the Philippines: "…friendly to the United States and are major trading partners." He also said, "Most have been cooperating in the war on terrorism."

In these countries, the United States will strive to work with willing governments, but it reserves the right to act alone and preemptively if they so refuse. One analyst described the new strategy thus: "countries that harbor terrorists, either by consent or because they are unable to enforce their laws within their territory, effectively forfeit their rights of sovereignty." According to a memorandum prepared by former Joint Chiefs of Staff chair Gen. Richard Myers — who had earlier been reported as pushing for deeper involvement in the country — the Philippines has been included in the list of "emerging targets for preemptive war" of a new U.S. military unit authorized to conduct clandestine operations abroad.

Beyond pursuing "terrorists," however, the SOF's stationing in the Philippines is an important component of the U.S. military's evolving global positioning. As the United States embarks on the most radical realignment of its worldwide presence since World War II, the aim, according to the QDR, is "to develop a basing system that provides greater flexibility for U.S. forces in critical areas of the world, placing emphasis on additional bases and stations beyond Western Europe and Northeast Asia." This includes the need to "provide temporary access to facilities in foreign countries that enable U.S. forces to conduct training and exercises in the absence of permanent ranges and bases." It also entails a change in emphasis from "from static defense, garrison forces" — such as those the United States had in Subic and Clark — "to mobile, expeditionary operations" as exemplified by the operations of the JSOTF-P in Sulu.

While discussing the current realignment of U.S. military presence, then U.S. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld had confirmed plans to establish "nodes" for Special Operations Forces in Asia. In 2004, then U.S. Pacific Command head Admiral Thomas Fargo also announced their intention to expand SOF presence in the region by setting up more "cooperative security locations (CSLs)," or military installations to which the United States will have access to, in Asia. The Overseas Basing Commission, an official body that reviews the U.S. overseas military infrastructure, has confirmed the Philippines is among the Asian countries where such "CSLs" are being developed. In November 2002, the Philippine and U.S. governments signed the Mutual Logistics and Servicing Agreement that, according to a military publication, made the Philippines a "supply base" of the United States.

In these plans, Special Forces hold a special place. More than other units, SOFs have usually been the contingent to count on to "gain or maintain U.S. access to strategically important foreign countries." In fact, another military contingent also composed mostly of Special Forces — the Combined Joint Task Force — Horn of Africa, US — was also established in Djibouti in 2002. With its mission and objectives very similar to the JSOTF-P, the Task Force has been described as a "model for future military operations."

These small and inconspicuous units fulfill the stated need of "maintaining a long-term, low visibility presence in many areas of the world where U.S. forces do not traditionally operate." And as Briscoe noted, the deployment in Sulu has "established an acceptable American military presence in the Southeast Pacific…" In other words, the JSOTF-P may not only be conducting war within the Philippines, it may have also entrenched a new form of U.S. bases in the country.

Herbert Docena is with the Focus on the Global South, a policy research institute. This article is based on a longer special report published by the institute.