'IN THE THICK OF IT'

U.S. and Philippine officials portray the U.S. troops role as passive "advisers" indirectly engaged in the operations from a distance. But reports indicate that their role has been more active and direct. From the beginning, the U.S. troops were authorized under the terms-of-reference between the U.S. and Philippine governments to fire back if shot at. Under this arrangement, U.S. Special Forces have "intentionally ventured into known Abu Sayyaf territory in an attempt to reassure locals while also dissuading the rebels from operating openly, as well as possibly tempting them to confront the Americans militarily," noted an analyst with the Washington D.C.-based Center for Defense Information.

	YANKEES GO HOME. Filipino-Americans join 100,000-strong protest march in New York denouncing the presence of U.S. soldiers in Korea and the Philippines. [photo courtesy of Indymedia]

Even as "advisers," Briscoe observed that the "guys were in thick of it" and were anxious to "get in the fight." He said the U.S. troops "expected to shoot or to be shot." Such an expectation would not seem misplaced for, as one writer for a war veterans' publication pointed out, "Though the Philippines (sic) constitution prohibits foreign soldiers from fighting within the island nation, U.S. troops are exposed to the same risks they would see in combat." In fact, in a June 2002 incident reported by the Los Angeles Times and confirmed in the Army magazine, U.S. Marines exchanged gunfire with alleged ASG members. Another incident reportedly had at least one U.S. soldier "killed in action," though not during a patrol. In March 2006, a Huey helicopter carrying U.S. troops to Sulu was attacked by unidentified assailants.

U.S. officials describe the Special Forces' role as "training, advising, and assisting" Filipino troops. During the on-the-job training against hostile forces, giving advice, helping, and actually being part of the action may well have overlapped. As Walley explained in her 2004 Special Warfare article, "Security-assistance missions preclude the trainers from being combatants or from performing duties in which they are likely to become combatants. But the trainers' credibility and effectiveness as teachers mandated that they accompany the AFP troops on their graduation exercise, of which combat was an integral part." Briscoe, for his part, pointed out that while their primary role was to train, their "unspoken" mission later changed to include "facilitating the rescue" of ASG hostages. He said this entailed assuming a more assertive and central role in the planning, decision-making, and execution of the operations.

At first, the U.S. troops were allowed to operate only at the battalion level, which left them frustrated. At one point, several U.S. media reports said, former U.S. Pacific Command chief Admiral Dennis Blair "tried to get too aggressive" while others in the military pressed for a "longer and more intense mission." JSOTF-P commander Maxwell also argued that confining the troops at the battalion was a "strategic error." But then U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld later authorized U.S. troops to operate at the company level and join patrols "as often as possible." This set-up is similar to the U.S. war in Afghanistan, where Special Forces troops joined and commanded 120-member companies of the Northern Alliance.

And so in June 2005, local residents told journalists that U.S. forces had joined the Philippine military in their operations against Abu Sayyaf members in Maguindanao province in mainland Mindanao — even when no training exercises or civil projects had been announced. A P3-Orion plane was seen flying over the area. In November of that year, the AFP launched operations allegedly against the Abu Sayyaf, even as those who were fighting back claimed to belong to the Moro National Liberation Front, a group whose peace agreement with the government had frayed but which was not tagged a "terrorist group" by either Manila or Washington.

Eyewitnesses said U.S. troops joined the Filipino soldiers in operations at the immediate vicinity of the fighting. U.S. soldiers were seen aboard military trucks with their Filipino counterparts and in rubber boats, mounting heavy artillery, operating military equipment, removing landmines, or evacuating casualties. Throughout the clashes, a spy plane — which locals said had been flying over the skies for months — hovered above the area where fighting was ongoing.

'SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCE'

U.S. officials dismissed these reports as "absolutely not true." Asserted JSOTF-P public affairs officer Lt. Col. Mark Zimmer: "We are not in any way involved in military operations conducted by the Philippine Armed Forces." Other military officials and reports, however, support the claims of the witnesses. The Filipino commander during the November 2005 operations, Gen. Nehemias Pajarito confirmed that U.S. troops were indeed at the vicinity of the fighting, but that they were just repairing water pipes while hostilities were ongoing. Another Filipino colonel attested that he had requested the U.S. troops' help in clearing landmines.

The U.S. troops' role in evacuating troop casualties had previously been reported and confirmed by the U.S. military itself. In 2002, A U.S. Air Force magazine reported that U.S. soldiers "helped infiltrate and extract ground forces" in the Philippines. In subsequent operations last September, a Filipino military spokesperson also confirmed that U.S. troops assisted in evacuating soldiers.

As for their role in spying, last February local residents in the south recovered an unmanned U.S. aerial vehicle that had crashed. A U.S. military spokesperson then said the spy planes were used for "humanitarian" projects, but other U.S. officials, including a general, have since stated that these have been used to hunt down targets. A report to the U.S. Congress also said P-3 aircraft provide "intelligence and communications support" to the AFP. Last September, Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita himself acknowledged that U.S. troops were using surveillance equipment to track down the ASG. That the surveillance was meant for combat had been confirmed as early as 2002 by then National Security Council adviser Golez, who was quoted as saying U.S. pilots on surveillance flights could "call in air strikes" if they spot ASG fighters.

In at least two reports, the Philippine Star has noted the U.S. troops' use of "unmanned planes, electronic tracking devices, eavesdropping mechanisms, experimental laser beacons, and a full range of US intelligence gadgets." Such use attests to the "special reconnaissance" mission that is a forte of Special Forces troops. According to the Army Field Manual, the mission's objective is "to confirm, refute, or obtain — by visual observation or other collection methods — information on the capabilities, intentions, and activities of an actual or potential enemy."

In these operations, the Special Forces were aided by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, which has admitted in one of its annual reports that it supported the Joint Task Forces by using "human intelligence" and through other technical operations. Ex-Philippine Ambassador to Washington Albert del Rosario also confirmed the establishment of an "intelligence fusion center" staffed by both U.S. and Filipino troops and the setting up of satellite equipment.

Moreover, U.S. soldiers have apparently enjoyed a special vantage point inside Philippine military headquarters during operations. (During the rescue of Abu Sayyaf hostages, for instance, some U.S. soldiers were reportedly stationed in the Philippine military command post.) What their role in decision-making is exactly and how they relate with Filipino officials they supposedly "advise" is not known. U.S. soldiers, however, are legally barred from being put under the command of foreign officers. And in at least one incident, Briscoe said, the U.S. commanders "steer(ed) the AFP leadership" into supporting a particular plan of action. To describe what is going on as "unconventional warfare" may not be farfetched, since the U.S. military itself defines such missions as those in which U.S. troops "direct" indigenous forces.