Okada’s company has applied to operate part of PAGCOR’s Entertainment City project in Pasay City.

According to reports filed with the US Securities and Exchange Commission, Okada had billeted “Naguiat, his wife, their three children, and nanny,” at company expense, in expensive suites at the Wynn Resorts Hotel that cost up to $6,000 a night.

In their 69-page information, the board of directors of Wynn filed with the Clark County of Nevada a case for breach of fiduciary duty and related offenses — “gross improprieties” and making “unlawful payments to foreign gambling regulators” — against Okada and his agents, Aruze USA, Inc., and Universal Entertainment Corp.

The PCIJ obtained a copy of the information that has been uploaded on www.vegasinc.com, as well as other documents related to Wynn vs Okada case from the US Securities and Exchange Commission database.

A careful study of the case information reveals even more intriguing details about apparent indiscretions that marked Naguiat’s conduct toward Okada.

The case document disclosed that in 36 separate instances, between May 2008 and June 2011, Okada and his agents made payments in the amount of $110,000 that directly benefited various PAGCOR officials, including Naguiat and his family, and former PAGCOR Chair Ephraim Genuino.

The amount was reportedly spent on “luxury lodging, extravagant dinners, shopping, and cash to spend for among others.”

Naguiat had stayed twice at Wynn Macau (September 22-26, 2010 and June 6-10, 2011) and once at Wynn Las Vegas (Nov. 15-20, 2010).

On top of the luxurious lodging, Okada also gave the Naguiats $5,000 “cash advance” during one of their stays in Macau.

See the relevant documents here:

• Wynn vs Okada
• Wynn Resorts LTD Filings with US Securities and Exchange Commission [1, 2, 3]
• PCIJ story, “Arroyo allies linked to Garci behind mystery firm in PAGCOR Tourism City,” (July 1, 2008)

During grilling by Defense lead counsel Serafin Cuevas on the 22nd day of the impeachment trial of Supreme Court Chief Justice Renato Corona, Cuevas asked de Lima categorically if the executive branch has any authority to review decisions or orders made by the SC.

“There is no such power,” de Lima acknowledged.

“Is there any function allotted to the executive branch reviewing decisions of the Supreme Court?” Cuevas asked.

“Also none,” de Lima said.

“If that is so, why could there be a dispute with regard to the validity of the order of the Supreme Court (with regard to the TRO)?” Cuevas said.

De Lima argued that this particular case was different because “the issue is the propriety of the TRO of the SC.”

“We are questioning the propriety of the TRO because it goes against the very essense of a TRO,” De Lima added.

De Lima had told the court that she prevented the former first family from leaving the country on the evening of November 15, 2011 even though the Supreme Court had already issued a TRO against her watchlist order. De Lima said that since the Department of Justice had not yet received a formal or official copy of the TRO.

In addition, de Lima said that it was her understanding that the Supreme Court had issued several conditions for the former first family to meet before they could be allowed to leave for abroad.

Presiding Officer Juan Ponce Enrile then asked if she would have respected the Supreme Court TRO if the Arroyo family had complied with all the conditions.

“Maybe, and maybe not,” de Lima said.

De Lima explained that she believed that the tribunal’s TRO was “improper” because it would have rendered the main issue pending before the Supreme Court “moot and academic.”

“A TRO is supposed to serve the status quo pending disposition of the merits of a case,” de Lima said. She said the TRO “had the effect of rendering the disposition of the main decision ineffectual because it is as if you had already granted the petition.”

“The main issue is should we allow the former President to leave despite the pendency of these big cases,” de Lima said. “In all honesty, hindi iyan ang function or office ng TRO.”

DEFENSE LAWYERS questioned the relevance of the testimony offered by Justice Secretary Leila de Lima in support of Article 7 of the impeachment complaint against Supreme Court Chief Justice Renato Corona.

Lead defense counsel Serafin Cuevas said that De Lima is effectively questioning the validity or merits of the temporary restraining order issued by the Supreme Court against her watchlist order against the former first couple. Cuevas said the TRO of the high tribunal is a collegial decision by the entire tribunal.

Cuevas added that De Lima’s testimony in effect “does not substantiate” the impeachment charge that Corona masterminded the granting of the TRO.

De Lima had told the court that she did not think that the petition of former president Gloria Macapagal Arroyo to be allowed to leave for abroad was a life and death issue. De Lima cited the itinerary submitted by Arroyo which showed that, aside from seeking treatment abroad, she also intended to attend the Clinton Global Initiative Conference.

“Sa pananaw ko po, ginawa lang dahilan yung health ng dating pangulo para sila maka-alis ng bansa,” De Lima said.

De Lima said that since it did not seem that the former President was in any immediate danger, she thought it more prudent to make sure that Arroyo stay in the country to face the three plunder and two electoral sabotage charge that government was preparing against her.

The full text of Article 7 follows:
VII. RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST THROUGH HIS PARTIALITY IN GRANTING A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER (TRO) IN FAVOR OF FORMER PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO AND HER HUSBAND JOSE MIGUEL ARROYO IN ORDER TO GIVE THEM AN OPPORTUNITY TO ESCAPE PROSECUTION AND TO FRUSTRATE THE ENDS OF JUSTICE, AND IN DISTORTING THE SUPREME COURT DECISION ON THE EFFECTIVITY OF THE TRO IN VIEW OF A CLEAR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE CONDITIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT’S OWN TRO.

7.1. The Supreme Court, under the Respondent, inexplicably consolidated the separate petitions filed by former President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and her husband Miguel Arroyo in order to question the validity of the Watch List Orders issued
against them by the Department of Justice pursuant to DOJ Circular No. 41 ironically issued by the DOJ under Arroyo’s
administration. By consolidating the petitions, the Supreme Court under Respondent unduly gave Miguel Arroyo an unwarranted
benefit since the alleged urgent health needs of President Arroyo would now be extended to him.

7.2. Worse, the Supreme Court, under the Respondent, immediately acted upon the Petition and granted the TRO despite the fact
that there are clear inconsistencies in former President Arroyo’s petition that casts serious doubts on the sincerity and
urgency of her request to leave the Philippines. As detailed in the dissent of Justice Ma. Lourdes Sereno, President Arroyo
presented “inconsistent, and probably untruthful statements” about her situation. Justice Sereno cited documents submitted by
the former president’s doctors belying her claims of threat to life. Aside from changes in the list of countries she wanted
to visit, President Arroyo was also planning to participate in two conferences. Hence, Justice Sereno noted: “It seems
incongruous for petitioner who has asked the Department of Justice and this Court to look with humanitarian concern on her
precarious state of health, to commit herself to attend these meetings and conferences at the risk of worsening her physical
condition.”

7.3. Moreover, it appears from reports that the ponente to whom the petitions were raffled was an Associate Justice. Under
the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court, a TRO can only be considered upon the recommendation of the ponente. Evidently, in
view of certain objections against the grant of the TRO, a holding of a hearing within the short period of five (5) days was
recommended. Despite this recommendation, the Respondent engineered a majority of 8 votes (as against five dissenters) the
immediate grant and issuance of the TRO in favour of former President Arroyo and her husband in blatant violation of their
own internal rules.

7.4. It also appears from the coordinated acts of the Arroyos that they were coordinating with Respondent’s Court. For how
can it be explained that they made multiple bookings on the same day expecting that they can leave the country on the very
same day their plea for a TRO was to be decided? It is not difficult to see that the hasty issuance of the TRO was a brazen
accommodation to the Arroyos. Not only that. Respondent bent over backwards to aid and abet the Arroyos’ plan to leave the
country on the very day of the session on their TRO plea. The Court’s office hours that usually end at 4:30 pm were extended
to allow the Arroyos to post a measly P2 million bond later and the Court process server was drafted to serve the TRO upon
the DOJ and the OSG after office hours.

7.5. Also, despite that fact that the Court, under Respondent, laid down conditions for the issuance of the TRO, Respondent
allowed the issuance of the TRO notwithstanding the fact that it was established that President Arroyo and Miguel Arroyo
failed to comply with an essential pre-condition that was meant to ensure the vesting of court jurisdiction in the event the
Arroyos flee prosecution. The condition was, to wit:

“(ii) The petitioners shall appoint a legal representative common to both of them who will receive subpoena, orders, and
other legal processes on their behalf during their absence.The petitioners shall submit the name of the legal representative,
also within five (5) days from notice hereof;” (Emphasis supplied.)

7.6. The Special Power of Attorney dated November 15, 2011 which they issued to their counsel fails to state that their
counsel had the power to receive subpoenas, orders and other legal processes. Instead, they only empowered their counsel to
“produce summons or receive documentary evidence”:

“That I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO, of legal age, married, Filipino with residence at 14 Badjao Street, Pansol, Quezon City, do
hereby name, constitute and appoint ATTY. FERDINAND TOPACIO, likewise of legal age, Filipino, with office address at Ground
floor, Skyway Twin Towers, H. Javier St., Ortigas Center, Pasig, Metro Manila, as my legal representative in the Philippines
and to be my true and lawful attorney-in-fact, for my name, place and stead, to do and perform the following acts and things,
to wit:

1. To sign, verify, and file a written statement;

2. To make and present to the court an application in connection with any proceedings in the suit;

3. To produce summons or receive documentary evidence;

4. To make and file compromise or a confession of judgment and to refer the case to arbitration;

5. To deposit and withdraw any money for the purpose of any proceeding;

6. To obtain copies of documents and papers; and

7. Generally to do all other lawful acts necessary for the conduct of the said case.” (Emphasis supplied.)

By virtue of the Arroyos’ abject failure to comply with this pre-condition, the TRO should not have been issued, nor deemed
effective.

7.7. Due to the Arroyos’ abject failure to comply with Condition 2, the Supreme Court en banc in its November 18, 2011
deliberations, by a vote of 7–6, found that there was no compliance with the second condition of the TRO. Consequently, for
failure to comply with an essential condition for the TRO, the TRO is not effective. However, by a vote of 7-6, the Supreme
Court decided there was no need to explicitly state the legal effect on the TRO of the noncompliance by petitioners with
Condition Number 2 of the earlier Resolution. As succinctly stated in Justice Ma. Lourdes Sereno’s dissent:

“The majority argued that such a clarification is unnecessary, because it is clear that the TRO is conditional, and cannot be
made use of until compliance has been done. It was therefore the sense of the majority that, as an offshoot of the winning
vote that there was failure by petitioners to comply with Condition Number 2, the TRO is implicitly deemed suspended until
there is compliance with such condition. Everyone believed that it would be clear to all that a conditional TRO is what it
is, conditional.”

7.8. However, the Supreme Court Spokesperson, Midas Marquez, made a public claim which was aired in all media outlets that
the Court ostensibly decided that the TRO was effective despite non-compliance with an essential condition of the TRO. He
even posited that the Arroyos can still leave the country. It is notable that Respondent did not chastise Marquez for his
outrightly false and public misrepresentation. Respondent, as Chief Justice, should have called to task Marquez for
misleading the public as to the import of the Supreme Court’s en banc ruling. Instead, he remained silent and did not bother
to contradict Marquez thereby aiding Marquez in spreading false news about the action of the Supreme Court.

7.9. Worse, the Respondent did not correct the decision that was issued despite the fact that the decision did not reflect
the agreement and decision made by the Supreme Court during their deliberations on November 18, 2011. Respondent subverted
the will of the Supreme Court and imposed his unilateral will by making it likewise appear that the TRO was effective despite
non-compliance with his own imposed pre-condition.

7.10. Clearly, therefore, Respondent knowingly fed Marquez the wrong sense and import of the deliberations of the Court on
the TRO issue. This false messaging intended for the public was deliberately made by Respondent to make it appear that indeed
the Arroyos can leave immediately and at any time. Clearly, Respondent’s action showed bias and a partisan stance in favor of
the Arroyos. Respondent’s action of causing a false message and twisting the sense and understanding of the Court during its
deliberations on this matter, betray not only his lack of independence, competence and probity, but more importantly, the
moral fiber to dispense justice as he would allow a frustration of justice for the Filipino People for personal gain and
commitment to his midnight benefactor.

7.11. Worse, despite the finding that the Arroyos failed to comply with an essential condition of the TRO, the Supreme Court,
headed by Respondent Corona in a 9-4 vote, ruled that the TRO was in effect.

Prosecution lawyer Giorgidi Aggabao told Presiding Officer Juan Ponce Enrile that they would no longer present any witnesses or evidence with regard to Article 3 of the impeachment complaint.

Article 3 alleges that Corona committed a culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust “by failing to meet and observe the stringent standards under Article VIII Section 7 (3) of the Constitution that provides that a member of the judiciary must be a person of proven competence integrity and probity and independence in allowing the Supreme Court to act on mere letters filed by a counsel which caused the issuance of flip-flopping decisions in final and executory cases.”

In addition, Article 3 alleges that Corona was guilty of “creating an excessive entanglement with Mrs (Gloria) Arroyo through her appointment of his wife to office; and discussing with litigants regarding cases pending before the Supreme Court.”

So far, prosecutors had only presented Roberto Anduiza, president of the Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines or FASAP. Prosecutors tried to show that Corona was instrumental in making the high tribunal reverse its earlier decision favoring FASAP after PAL lawyer Estelito Mendoza wrote a personal letter to the Supreme Court.

Aggabao said prosecutors were no longer going to try to prove the charge of excessive entanglement between Corona and former President Arroyo, or the charge that Corona had discussed a pending case with a litigant.

The move surprised Senator-Judges, who asked Aggabao repeatedly if prosecutors were certain of their moves. Aggabao replied that prosecutors were confident that they had sufficiently proven Article 3 through Anduiza’s testimony alone. Aggabao said prosecutors were ready to stand on the strength of Anduiza’s testimony and were ready to move on so as not to waste the time of the impeachment court.

In a statement, the Bangko Sentral said it was the PSBank’s Compliance Officer at the time who flagged the Bangko Sentral examiners about the selection of Corona as winner of P1 million in the bank’s raffle for “valued account holders.”

“Having noted that the Chief Justice is PSBank’s client, Examiner Jerry Leal verified PSBank’s policy on politically exposed persons or PEP. Under BSP regulations, a bank is required to have such a policy in place. Maintaining a PEP list is a standard element of an effective anti-money laundering compliance program in accordance with international best practices. Examiner Jerry Leal then requested for PSBank’s PEP list,” the Bangko Sentral statement added.

Thereafter, “on examining PSBank’s PEP list,  Examiner Jerry Leal saw that the Chief Justice was not tagged as a PEP. In addition, by comparing the PSBank’s  PEP list with its covered transaction reports (CTR) submitted to the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC), Examiner Leal noted a few other names likewise not tagged as PEP.”

“As a result,” the statement said, ”the Report of Examination (ROE) carried the finding that PSBank’s PEP list is not comprehensive. PSBank was therefore directed to improve its tagging of PEPs to  strengthen its compliance with the AMLA, as amended.”         

However, the Bangko Sentral stressed that its examiners “never requested to see the deposit account records of the Chief Justice nor were they presented the deposit account records of the Chief Justice. BSP examiners therefore could NOT have copied nor secured copies of such deposit account records including the signature cards of Chief Justice Renato Corona.”

“We emphasize,” the Bangko Sentral said, “that discussion between BSP Examiner Jerry Leal and the PSBank Compliance Officer concerning the Chief Justice was limited to the extent of validating PSBank’s compliance with PEP tagging.”

The Bangko Sentral said its statement was made “in response to issues raised at the impeachment hearing at the Senate on Monday, February 20,” when PSBank President Pascual Garcia III was called to testify yet again.

What follows is the full statement of the Bangko Sentral:

20 February 2012
STATEMENT FROM THE BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS:
 
“In response to issues raised at the impeachment hearing at the Senate today, 20 February, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas declared the following: 

• BSP examiners did not access the deposit account records which include the signature cards of Chief Justice Renato Corona. They never requested to see the deposit account records of the Chief Justice nor were they presented the deposit account records of the Chief Justice. BSP examiners therefore could NOT have copied nor secured copies of such deposit account records including the signature cards of Chief Justice Renato Corona.      

• In the course of the BSP’s regular examination of PSBank between October 21, 2010 and December 6, 2010  (long before the impeachment trial),  the  PSBank’s  Compliance Officer at the time, Grace de la Cruz,  disclosed to BSP Examiner Jerry Leal  (a member of the Anti-Money Laundering Specialist Group of the BSP’s Supervision and Examination Sector)  that the Chief Justice won P1 million in the PSBank’s raffle for its valued account holders.  Having noted that the Chief Justice is PSBank’s client, Examiner Jerry Leal verified PSBank’s policy on politically exposed persons or PEP. Under BSP regulations, a bank is required to have such a policy in place. Maintaining a PEP list is a standard element of an effective anti-money laundering compliance program in accordance with international best practices. Examiner Jerry Leal then requested for PSBank’s PEP list.  

       On examining PSBank’s PEP list,  Examiner Jerry Leal saw that the Chief Justice was not tagged as a PEP. In addition, by comparing the PSBank’s  PEP list with its covered    transaction reports (CTR) submitted to the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC), Examiner Leal noted a few other names likewise not tagged as PEP. 

       As a result, the Report of Examination (ROE) carried the finding that PSBank’s PEP list is not comprehensive. PSBank was therefore directed to improve its tagging of PEPs to  strengthen its compliance with the AMLA, as amended.         

We emphasize that discussion between BSP Examiner Jerry Leal and the PSBank Compliance Officer concerning the Chief Justice was limited to the extent of validating PSBank’s compliance with PEP tagging.”

IT WAS NOT the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC) that conducted an audit of the Philippine Savings bank (PSBank) in September-November 2010, where Supreme Court Chief Justice Renato C. Corona has several bank accounts that are now the subject of his impeachment trial at the Senate.

In fact, the AMLC does not conduct audits, special or routine, of banks, according to AMLC Executive Director Vicente Aquino (no relation to President Aquino).
AMLC’s Aquino, interviewed by the PCIJ, said: “AMLC has no audit functions. Under the AMLA (Anti-Money Laundering Act) law, as amended, AMLC is an independent and separate government agency distinct from the Bangko Sentral Anti-Money Laundering Specialist Group, which conducts routine or special investigations and audits of banks.”

In contrast, Aquino said AMLC conducts “special investigations to detect money-laundering activities… and under the law, may inquire into any particular bank account or deposit, but only upon orders of a competent court.”

Before it could launch an investigation, Aquino said AMLC has to file an inquiry request with a court, and “the court has to give advance notice to the account owner.” This procedure, Aquino said, “we find ridiculous.”

“Why should we give advance notice to a person who is the subject of our inquiry?” Aquino asked.

To lift this requirement of prior notice to account owners who are the subject of AMLC investigations, Aquino said his agency has filed a bill now pending before the Senate. “It is the biggest stumbling block to our work.”

What follows is a Statement of the Anti-Money Laundering Council re PSBank President’s Testimony

The Anti-Money Laundering Council today said the testimony of PSBank President Pascual Garcia alleging its involvement in the examination of the deposit accounts of Supreme Court Chief Justice Renato C. Corona is  inaccurate, misleading, and unfair.  In the interest  of truth, the AMLC hereby states for the record that:   
      
1.        The AMLC has NOT conducted any audit, targeted or otherwise, of Chief Justice Renato C. Corona’s deposit accounts with PSBank. The AMLC has no audit functions under the AMLA, as amended. 

2.        The AMLC likewise did NOT conduct an inquiry into or examination of Chief Justice Corona’s deposit accounts with PSBank.  Under Sec. 11 of the AMLA, as amended, “the AMLC may inquire into or examine any particular deposit or investment with any banking institution or non-bank financial institution upon order of any competent court in cases of violation of said law, when it has been established that there is probable cause that the deposits or investments are related to an unlawful activity as defined in Section 3(i) thereof or a money laundering offense under Section 4 thereof.”  Without an enabling court order, therefore, the AMLC cannot conduct such inquiry or examination except where the predicate crime involved is kidnapping for ransom, a narcotics offense and hijacking, destructive arson or murder, including those perpetrated by terrorists against non-combatant persons and similar targets. 
If and when the AMLC applies with a competent court for an inquiry order, the court must first give prior notice to the account owner about the planned inquiry or examination, pursuant to the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Republic of the Philippines  v. Hon. Antonio M. Eugenio, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 174629, February 14, 2008. 
Given this legal impediment, the AMLC has been working with Congress to amend the AMLA to authorize it to conduct bank inquiry without giving advance notice to the account owner.     

3.        AMLC’s financial investigators have not set foot in PSBank’s Katipunan branch. Neither have they requested, been shown, copied, nor received any identity documents and specimen signature cards of Chief Justice Corona from PSBank or any of its branches. Hence, the AMLC could not have leaked out deposit account records including the signature cards of the Chief Justice with PSBank.   

4.        Finally, the AMLC is a distinct and independent government agency.  

PROSECUTORS INSISTED that they should have been allowed to present Philippine Airlines vice president for sales Enrique Javier to prove that Supreme Court Chief Justice Renato Corona received benefits from PAL that would have affected his impartiality in ruling on a PAL labor case, even as Presiding Officer Juan Ponce Enrile shot down with finality the prosecution’s appeal.

Enrile had ruled that prosecutors would be going beyond the scope of Article 3 of the complaint, where it is alleged that Supreme Court Chief Justice Renato Corona committed culpable violations of the Constitution and betrayed public trust by failing to show “competence, integrity, probity, and independence” through reversals of prominent decisions made by the Supreme Court.

Prosecutor Niel Tupas said they took exception to Enrile’s ruling preventing the testimony of Javier before the impeachment court. Enrile ruled that the impeachment complaint did not allege that Corona received any bribes. Even then, Enrile said, the impeachment court would have to make a ruling on whether such a bribe would constitute a high crime.

Tupas argued that the charge that Corona received special benefits from PAL was relevant to the impeachment as it proves motive.

“To us the motive here is very important, crucial, critical to the impeachment proceeding,” Tupas said. “The motive for the Chief Justice in flipflopping, and why the Chief Justice acted on a mere letter from Atty Estelito Mendoza.”

“We allege here the flipflopping, we allege the mereacting on a letter by Attorney Mendoza,” Tupas said.

“You should have alleged bribery (in your impeachment complaint),” Enrile said. “That is the tendency of the evidence that you are presenting.”

Tupas insisted that the heart of Article 3 of the impeachment complaint is Corona’s “integrity, independence, and probity.”

“I am basing my ruling on your allegations and nothing more,” Enrile responded. “Do you want me to order you to amend your articles of impeachment and send them back to the House of Representatives?”

Tupas then proceeded to say that “technicalities cannot be permitted to prevail,” a statement that earned the ire of Enrile. “This is not a technicality, the grounds for impeachment are clearly stated in Article 11 of the Constitution. We are already very liberal here. You are asking us to review the decisions of the Supreme Court. Who are we to review the decisions of the Supreme Court? But we allowed it in order not to embarass you, but you are going too far. Do you want me to lecture to you more?”

“You are in effect alleging that he was bribed to make that decision,” Enrile added.

Prosecutor Marlon Manuel however made a proffer of evidence in order to insert some of the prosecution’s allegations into the record. Manuel read portions of the evidence they had on hand that showed that Corona was issued a PAL platinum card that was used four times for trips abroad in 2010 and 2011: roundtrip journeys between Manila and Guam in April 2011; Manila and Singapore in April 2011; Manila and Honolulu in December 2010; and Manila and Hong Kong in December 2010.

In addition, another platinum card showed 12 roundtrip travels between the following destinations: Manila and Jakarta in July 2011; Manila and Guam in April 2011; Manila and Singapore in April 2011; Manila and Bangkok in March 2011; Manila Honolulu in December 2010; Manila Hong Kong in December 2010; Manila Bacolod in July 2011; Manila and General Santos in June 2011; Manila and Cebu March 2011; Manila Tagbilaran March 2011; Manila General Santos March 2011; and Manila and Cebu in February 2011.

ARTICLE III of the CORONA IMPEACHMENT TRIAL

III. RESPONDENT COMMITTED CULPABLE VIOLATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST BY FAILING TO MEET AND OBSERVE THE STRINGENT STANDARDS UNDER ART. VIII, SECTION 7 (3) OF THE CONSTITUTION THAT PROVIDES THAT “[A] MEMBER OF THE JUDICIARY MUST BE A PERSON OF PROVEN COMPETENCE, INTEGRITY, PROBITY, AND INDEPENDENCE” IN ALLOWING THE SUPREME COURT TO ACT ON MERE LETTERS FILED BY A COUNSEL WHICH CAUSED THE ISSUANCE OF FLIP-FLOPPING DECISIONS IN FINAL ANDEXECUTORY CASES; IN CREATING AN EXCESSIVE ENTANGLEMENT WITH MRS. ARROYO THROUGH HER APPOINTMENT OF HIS WIFE TO OFFICE; AND IN DISCUSSING WITH LITIGANTS REGARDING CASES PENDING BEFORE THESUPREME COURT.

3.1. Respondent was appointed to the Supreme Court on April 9, 2002 by Mrs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. Prior to his appointment, he served Arroyo for many years as her chief of staff, and spokesman when she was Vice-President, and later as her Presidential Chief-of-Staff, Presidential Spokesman, and Acting Executive Secretary.

3.2. Art. VIII, Section 7 (3) of the 1987 Constitution provides that “[a] Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence.” Members
of the Judiciary are expected to have these four qualities mandated by the Constitution because these form the very foundation for maintaining people’s faith in the Judiciary. Thus, it has been ruled by no less than the Supreme Court that:

“People who run the judiciary, particularly justices and judges, must not only be proficient in both the substantive and procedural aspects of the law, but more importantly, they must possess the highest degree of integrity and probity and an unquestionable moral uprightness both in
their public and private lives.”

Although every office in the government service is a public trust, no position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness than a seat in the Judiciary. High ethical
principles and a sense of propriety should be maintained, without which the faith of the people in the Judiciary so indispensable in an orderly society cannot be preserved.

3.3. Just very recently, the flip-flopping of the Corona Court on Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines (FASAP) v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., et al. – the recall of a
September 7, 2011 Decision of the Supreme Court’s Second Division denying a Second Motion for Reconsideration of the 2008 ruling in favor of FASAP, on a mere letter from Philippine Airlines’ counsel Atty. Estelito Mendoza (who is the reported lead counsel of Respondent’s patroness; see Annexes “F” to “F-3”, infra), and without requiring a comment from or notice to the other parties to hear their side, betray Respondent’s lack of ethical principles and his disdain for fairness which has eroded the faith of the people in the Judiciary – for Respondent himself
caused and allowed the violation of the adverse party’s constitutional right to due process.

3.3.1. The matter is made worse since the recall is reported to have been at the instance of Respondent Corona, who admitted that in 2008, he inhibited from the case. How then can he
justify his interference in this case today? Why take part or interfere now?

3.3.2. What is even more disturbing is that under Respondent Corona’s watch as Chief Justice, the Supreme Court appears to be acting on mere letters kept hidden from those concerned and the
other parties – and all from the same lawyer – Estelito Mendoza.

3.3.3 It must be recalled that the same Estelito Mendoza wrote a personal letter to Respondent which also caused the flip-flopping in the League of Cities v. COMELEC case. It must also be
recalled that Estelito Mendoza is also the same person who filed Administrative Matter No. 10-2-5-SC, and was among the petitioners in the Supreme Court who posited that Mrs. Arroyo may appoint the next Chief Justice despite the constitutional ban; and through which petition, made it possible for the Supreme Court to legitimize and provide not only a strained but obviously
erroneous basis for the midnight and constitutionally-prohibited appointment of Respondent.

3.3.4. In this connection, Respondent’s voting pattern even prior to his dubious appointment as Chief Justice, clearly proves a bias and manifest partiality for Mrs. Arroyo. It must be noted
that under the law, bias need not be proven to actually exist; it is enough that the Chief Justice’s actions lend themselves to a reasonable suspicion that he does not possess the
required probity and impartiality. In Rosauro v. Villanueva, the Supreme Court held that:
“A judge should not only render a just, correct and impartial decision but should do so in such a manner as to be free from any suspicion as to its fairness and impartiality and as to his
integrity. While a judge should possess proficiency in law in order that he can competently construe and enforce the law, it is more important that he should act and behave in such a
manner that the parties before him should have confidence in his impartiality. Thus, it is not enough that he decides cases without bias and favoritism. Nor is it sufficient that he in fact
rids himself of prepossessions. His actuations should moreover inspire that belief. Like Caesar’s wife, a judge must not only be pure but beyond suspicion.” [Underscoring supplied]

3.3.5. The bar is higher for judges, and by inference, highest for Justices and most especially the Chief Justice, because “the character of a judge is perceived by the people not only through
his official acts but also through his private morals, as reflected in his external behavior.” Thus, “a judge should, in a pending or prospective litigation before him, be scrupulously careful to
avoid such action as may reasonably tend to waken the suspicion that his social or business relations or friendships constitute an element in determining his judicial course.”
[Underscoring and emphases supplied]

3.3.6. If a decision that is legally correct or justifiable can suffer from a suspicion of impartiality, more so will a decision that is entirely unsupported by legal reasoning. Thus, it
has been held that a judge who “is ignorant of fairly elementary and quite familiar legal principles and administrative regulations, has a marked penchant for applying unorthodox, even
strange theories and concepts in the adjudication of controversies, exhibits indifference to,
and even disdain for due process and the rule of law, applies the law whimsically, capriciously, and oppressively, and displays bias and partiality”, is unfit to be a judge.

3.4. Respondent further compromised his independence when his wife, Cristina Corona, accepted an appointment on March 23, 2007 from Mrs. Gloria Arroyo to the Board of the John Hay Management Corporation (JHMC). The JHMC is a wholly-owned subsidiary corporation of the Bases Conversion
Development Authority (BCDA), a government-owned-and-controlled corporation created under Republic Act No. 7227.

3.4.1. Shortly after assuming her well-paying job at JHMC, serious complaints were filed against Mrs. Corona by her fellow Board members, as well as from the Management and rank-and-file
employees of the JHMC. Mrs. Corona’s election as Director and President was reportedly withdrawn in a resolution passed by the Board of Directors of JHMC because of acts of misconduct and
negligence. Copies of the JHMC Board Resolution withdrawing Mrs. Corona’s election as JHMC President and Chairman, the Position Paper prepared by the JHMC Management, and the resignation letter of retired Court of Appeals Justice Teodoro Regino from the JHMC Board of Directors, all
of which chronicle the serious irregularities committed by Mrs. Corona, are attached hereto as Annexes “G”, “H” and “I”, respectively.

3.4.2. Instead of acting upon the serious complaints against Mrs. Corona, Mrs. Arroyo instructed all members of the JHMC to tender their courtesy resignations immediately. After the
resignations, Mrs. Corona was retained and even promoted after President Arroyo expressed her desire for Mrs. Corona’s election as OIC Chairman of the JHMC Board.

3.4.3. Despite the numerous other complaints against Mrs. Corona, including one from Baguio Mayor Reinaldo Bautista where he protested Mrs. Corona’s move to replace the members of the JHMC Management Team, in violation of the terms of City Council Resolution No. 362 which protects the security of tenure in the JHMC of local residents occupying key positions in the corporation (a copy of his letter dated July 25, 2007 is attached as Annex “J”), and despite adverse findings
in the COA report that also established that she was improperly holding office in St. Ignatius Village in Quezon City, Mrs. Corona was not removed from her position. She was even allowed to
rack up unnecessary expenses totalling Six Hundred Ninety Thousand And One Hundred Eighty-Three Pesos (P690,183.00) which she spent holding office in Quezon City when JHMC’s operations were all in Baguio City. A copy of the COA report is attached as Annex “K”.

3.4.4. Mrs. Corona’s job was ensured with specific instructions of Mrs. Arroyo expressed through several desire letters issued to the BCDA specifically to ensure the election of Mrs. Corona to
several positions in the JHMC, copies of which are attached as Annexes “L”, “L-1” and “L-2”. This also explains why despite the serious complaints against Mrs. Corona, Mrs. Arroyo never
removed her from JHMC but instead kept on promoting and protecting her.

3.4.5. Mrs. Corona’s appointment is a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct that provides: “Judges shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or
judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the private interests of others, nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a
special position to influence the judge.” [Sec. 4, Canon 1; emphasis and underscoring supplied] “Judges shall not use or lend the prestige of the judicial office to advance their private
interests, or those of a member of their family or of anyone else, nor shall they convey or permit others to convey the impression that anyone is in a special position improperly to
influence them in the performance of judicial duties.” [Sec. 8, Canon 4; emphasis and underscoring supplied]

3.4.6. The New Code of Judicial Conduct further provides that it is unethical for a magistrate and members of his family to ask for or receive any gift in exchange for any act done or to be
done by the judge in the course of his judicial functions:
“Judges and members of their families shall neither ask for, nor accept, any gift, bequest, loan or favor in relation to anything done or to be done or omitted to be done by him or her in
connection with the performance of judicial duties.” [Sec. 8, Canon 4; emphasis and underscoring supplied]
“Judges shall not only be free from inappropriate connections with, and influence by, the executive and legislative branches of government, but must also appear to be free therefrom to a
reasonable observer.” [Sec. 5, Canon 1; emphasis and underscoring supplied]

3.4.7. Clearly, a grossly improper (although personally and mutually beneficial) relationship between the Respondent and Mrs. Arroyo was created when Mrs. Corona was appointed to the JHMC. The JHMC is a GOCC under the Executive Department headed by Mrs. Arroyo. The appointment of Mrs.
Corona in JHMC as its highest management officer is clearly intended to secure the loyalty and vote of Respondent in the Supreme Court. In a similar case, the Supreme Court found it unethical for the judge to allow his daughters to accept the business offer of persons who have a pending
case before the judge’s court:
“The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary prescribes that judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the
view of a reasonable observer. Thus, judges are to avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all their activities. Likewise, they are mandated not to allow family, social or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment, nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge. The Code
clearly prohibits judges or members of their families from asking for or accepting, any gift, bequest, loan or favor in relation to anything done or to be done or omitted to be done by him
or her in connection with the performance of judicial duties. Respondent judge failed to live up to these standards. Despite knowledge of Onofre and Mariano’s intentions in offering the
business to his daughters, respondent judge allowed his daughters to accept the offer of business partnership with persons who have pending cases in his court.”

3.4.8. Respondent should be held to even higher standards because he is the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Since joining JHMC, Mrs. Corona received a substantial salary, aside from other
perks of the job, including cars and various travel opportunities. In exchange, as discussed above, the voting record of Respondent in the Supreme Court indicate an unmistakable pattern of
favoring Arroyo in cases brought before the Supreme Court challenging her policies and actions. All these foregoing facts betray the Respondent’s lack of qualification as Chief Justice as he
has demonstrated a lack of competence, integrity, probity, or independence.

3.4.9. Respondent reportedly dipped his hands into public funds to finance personal expenses. Numerous personal expenses that have nothing to do with the discharge of his official functions,
such as lavish lunches and dinners, personal travels and vacations, and fetes and parties, have reportedly been charged by the Respondent to judicial funds. In essence, Respondent has been
reportedly using the judicial fund as his own personal expense account, charging to the Judiciary personal expenditures.

3.4.10. It is therefore apparent that there is reasonable ground to hold Respondent for the reported misuse of public funds, and in acts that would qualify as violations of the anti-graft
and corrupt practices act, including malversation of public funds, and use of public funds for private purposes.

3.5. In addition, Respondent Corona failed to maintain high standards of judicial conduct in connection with the Vizconde massacre case, in the process, casted doubt upon the integrity of
the Supreme Court itself.

3.5.1. All judges must “exhibit and promote high standards of judicial conduct in order to reinforce public confidence in the judiciary, which is fundamental to the maintenance of
judicial independence.” To do so, it is required “that his or her conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession and litigants
in the impartiality of the judge and of the judiciary.” Included in this prescription of what constitutes acceptable and non-acceptable conduct is that rule that judges “shall not knowingly,
while a proceeding is before or could come before them, make any comment that might reasonably be expected to affect the outcome of such proceeding or impair the manifest fairness of the
process. Nor shall judges make any comment in public or otherwise that might affect the fair trial of any person or issue.” Likewise, “(j)udges shall not, in the performance of judicial
duties, by words or conduct, manifest bias or prejudice towards any person or group on irrelevant grounds.”

3.5.2. Despite these strictures, Respondent has directly, deliberately, and shamelessly attempted to destroy the credibility and standing of the Supreme Court with respect to one
important and publicly-celebrated case that was before it on automatic appeal: the celebrated Vizconde Massacre case.

3.5.3. Sometime in early September 2010, Lauro Vizconde, surviving member of the Vizconde family who were murdered in 1991, and Dante Jimenez of the Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption (VACC) paid a courtesy call upon the Respondent in his chambers after his appointment as Chief
Justice.

3.5.4. During the courtesy call, Vizconde asked the Respondent about the status of the multiple murder case against Hubert Webb and the other accused, which was at the time pending appeal
before the Supreme Court. Despite the obvious impropriety, Respondent, instead of rebuffing Vizconde for asking the questions, engaged Vizconde in a personal and ex-parte conversation regarding a case then pending consideration before the Supreme Court.

3.5.5. Worse, in the course of the conversation, Respondent told Vizconde, in the presence of Jimenez, that fellow Justice Antonio Carpio was allegedly lobbying for the acquittal of Hubert
Webb. According to Vizconde in a sworn Affidavit dated January 27, 2011, Respondent said that “Talagang brina-braso at ini-impluwensiyahan ni Carpio ang kanyang mga kasama para
mapawalang-sala si Webb [Carpio was really arm-twisting and influencing his colleagues to acquit Webb],” or words to that effect. Jimenez corroborated Vizconde’s statement in his own sworn
Affidavit dated January 26, 2011.

3.5.6. The fact that Respondent spoke with Vizconde regarding a case pending before the Supreme Court is in itself already a serious breach of the rule of confidentiality that must be maintained by the Court with respect to cases pending before it, as well as the deliberations of the members of the Court. Such confidentiality is absolutely necessary in order to ensure that

members of the Court are insulated from lobbying and pressure coming from any of the litigants of a pending case. Respondent’s action, as Chief Justice, is in itself unbecoming and unworthy
of a Chief Justice.

3.5.7. Indeed, in Re: Letter of Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, the Supreme Court sanctioned a justice of the Court of Appeals for a similar act of discussing a pending case with
interested parties for having “failed to maintain the high standard of independence and propriety that is required of him.” The Supreme Court further held:
“Taking his conversation with his brother and his encounters with Mr. de Borja together, Justice Sabio gives the impression that he is accessible to lobbyists who would unfairly try to
manipulate court proceedings. Even assuming arguendo that Justice Sabio was not moved by his brother’s request and that he rejected Mr. de Borja’s bribe offer, the Court feels compelled to
call Justice Sabio’s attention to his own shortcomings under the circumstances. At the very least, Justice Sabio should have realized that his discussions of court matters, especially
those that have not yet been made of public record, with persons who are interested in the case were incredibly indiscreet and tended to undermine the integrity of judicial processes. We see
no reason to reverse the Panel’s finding that Justice Sabio’s conversations with his brother and Mr. de Borja were ‘indiscreet and imprudent’.”

3.5.8. Significantly, Respondent signed and concurred with the above-mentioned Resolution of the Supreme Court. Yet, Respondent Corona committed the same pernicious act of discussing a pending case with interested parties.

3.5.9. Worse, however, is the fact that Respondent intrigued against the honor and integrity of a fellow Justice in his absence, in the process, maligning and undermining the credibility of
the Supreme Court as an institution. By painting for Vizconde a picture of a Court that is subject to the influence of one out of 15 Justices, and making it appear that the eventual
decision of the Court in the case would be attributable to internal arm-twisting and influence, Respondent destroyed the credibility of the very institution that he was supposed to be leading.

3.5.10. In trying to pin the blame of a possible acquittal upon a fellow Justice, Respondent was himself sowing the seeds of discontent and distrust of the Supreme Court with a party litigant.
As it happened, Vizconde and Jimenez did raise the supposed internal arm-twisting and influence before the media while the case was in the final stages of decision. By provoking Vizconde to
pre-empt the decision with negative publicity, Respondent himself is guilty of directly undermining the trust and confidence of the public in the Supreme Court regardless of what its
decision would have later turned out to be.

3.5.11. Worse still, is that the act of the Respondent violates Sec. 3(k) of Rep. Act 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which prohibits any official from “(d)ivulging
valuable information of a confidential character, acquired by his office or by him on account of his official position to unauthorized persons, or releasing such information in advance of its
authorized release date.” It is clear from the context of the conversation with Vizconde and Jimenez, that Respondent was signalling the latter to prepare for an acquittal, and giving them
someone to blame therefor. Given the high profile of the case, it is not unreasonable to assume that at the time of the conservation, the Supreme Court had already begun deliberations on the
case, and that Respondent already had a sense of what the decision of the Court would probably be.

3.6. Respondent Corona with undue haste, impropriety and irregularity, dismissed the inter-petal recreational corporation case under suspicious circumstances.

3.6.1. Respondent was accused by Fernando Campos of unethical conduct when he met ex parte with the lawyer of the adverse party in connection with a pending case before him. In an attempt to defend himself against the complaint for unethical conduct filed against him by Campos, Respondent explicitly admitted violating the New Code of Judicial Conduct. In his letter dated February 8, 2010 to the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC), Respondent refuted the claim of Campos that he allegedly met with a lawyer of Philweb Corporation in connection with a case pending before him but countered that:

“On the contrary, it was Campos himself who actively tried to pressure me into deciding G.R. No. 186711 in his favor. I was pestered by calls from different people on his behalf. By his own
admission in his ‘executive summary,’ he asked Justice Angelina Gutierrez, Santiago Kapunan and Leonardo Quisumbing, among others to intercede for him.” (Emphasis supplied)

3.6.2 In his very own words, Respondent admitted that various persons were able to communicate with him in connection with a case that was pending before him precisely in an attempt to
influence him in his resolution of the said case. In allowing himself to be approached by persons which he knew were trying to exercise their influence over him on a particular case
pending before him and in failing to take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures against such actions, Respondent violated basic precepts of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, which
provides, among others, that:

“Canon 1
Independence
Sec. 1. Judges shall exercise the judicial function independently on the basis of their assessment of the facts and in accordance with a conscientious understanding of the law, free
from extraneous influence, inducement, pressure, threat or interference, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.

x x x
Sec. 4. Judges shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the private interests of others, nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge.
Sec. 5. Judges shall not only be free from inappropriate connections with, and influence by, the executive and legislative branches of government, but must also appear to be free therefrom to a reasonable observer.”

“Canon II
Integrity
Sec. 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.
Sec. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people’s faith in the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done.
Sec. 3. Judges should take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures against lawyers or court personnel for unprofessional conduct of which the judge may have become aware.”

“Canon III
Impartiality
x x x
Sec. 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of
the judge and of the judiciary.”

“Canon IV
Propriety
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge.
Sec. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.”

3.6.3. To restate in In Re: Letter of Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, the Supreme Court held that such conduct amounted to a failure to maintain the high standard of independence and
propriety that is required of a judge.

3.6.4. For emphasis, Respondent signed and concurred with the above-mentioned Resolution of the Supreme Court. Surely, Respondent, as Chief Justice, cannot be exempt from the same rule and principle. As Chief Justice, he must in fact be held to a higher standard. The Supreme Court further said of justices:
“While it may be true that from a psychological stand point ordinary persons can have a wide variety of valid reactions to any given situation, Justice Sabio should bear in mind his high
office as a magistrate of the appellate court sets him apart from ordinary persons. Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, members of the bench should freely and willingly accept
behavioral restrictions that may be viewed by ordinary citizens as burdensome.” (emphasis supplied)

3.6.5. Moreover, Respondent not only should have scrupulously guarded his reputation as a Supreme Court Justice, it behooved upon him to have done a positive act to ensure that Campos
and the latter’s emissaries be dealt with administratively for the brazen attempt to influence a magistrate of the Supreme Court. This he utterly failed to do.