An Agenda for the Remaining Twenty-One Months of the Aquino Administration
The constitutional term of the present administration is 76 months. There are only 21 months left of that term to complete the successful transition of the country from a dictatorship to a full-fledged democracy. That tak is not that of the President alone, or of the government, but of the entire society itself.
Despite the installation of the formal structures and the advances in democratic processes, the EDSA Revolt that installed Corazon C Aquino as President did not result in the far-reaching revolution many people had hoped for. Most of these expectations were embodied in the new Constitution, but have largely remained unfulfilled. Therefore, stated simply, the job to be done in the next 21 months is to galvanize the people behind a national vision based on the agenda ratified by the people.
a. On the part of the Executive Department, a review of key policies and programs in the light of results, an acceptance of shortcomings where these exist, and a performance review of appointive officials.
The first step, therefore, in putting the country back on track is to galvanize national unity.
As part of the process of self-reflection, the Executive Department must review existing policies and programs and establish clear directions for the next 21 months, particularly in the area of basic services. Government officials who have not performed or are responsible for failed programs have to be replaced. The economic situation and shortfalls in performance relative to targets cannot all be blamed on external factors and inherited problems. Furthermore, much can still be accomplished in 21 months. That is approximately the difference between the first term of a reelectable president under the 1935 Constitution and the six-year term of a non-reelectable president under the new Constitution. The expectation is a president will act as a statesman during that period rather than as a politician seeking another term. However, the appointment of new people would only make sense if the correct policies and programs are in place. Two major revamps occurred after coup attempts and were perceived to have been a reaction to the coups rather than a genuine effort to address issues of substance. Subsequent events tended to validate this perception. What is being asked of the Executive Department is to enforce the same principle of accountability being required of the military.
While there is understandably a reluctance by President Aquino to exercise power in a manner that might be compared with former President Marcos, a democracy in a crisis of transition calls for a firmer and more direct hand at the helm. People understand that a ship is never always on course. But the ship that arrives safely at its destination is theone which constantly checks its bearings, corrects itself on time, and accelerates ts speed when it is firmly on course.
The leader who transcends himself will be followed by his crew, even those who may believe that there is a shorter and safer route. It is the vision and the decisiveness that count. b. On the part of the President, a categorical declaration of her position with respect to the issue of re-election.
c. On the part of the President, the immediate convening of the National Security Council and an initiative to invite all political parties to enter into a compact, to which peoples organizations and citizen groups would also subscribe, to defend and preserve our democracy, abjure the use of force and violence to effect change, commit to the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections in 1992, and arrive at solutions to our national problems through an honest and open debate of issues and programs; and on the part of the political opposition, a positive response to the call for a united front against unconstitutional means to change the government and for upholding democratic processes.
The President can take the initiative in creating a new climate of "unity in diversity" by immediately convening the National Security Council. Then, she can issue a call for all political parties to sign a solemn compact before the people to uphold democracy, to resist with all the resources at their command any attempt to subvert or destroy it, and to participate fully in the elections in 1992.
The political opposition must be willing to respond positively to this initiative, following the example of their counterparts in such countries as Venezuela and Argentina where they actualized a vow to set aside their differences when democracy is threatened by military adventurism. One does not have to be in power to contribute in nation-building.
The Nacionalista Party led by Blas Ople and Senator Enrile missed a historic opportunity to put into practice what it preaches by way of reconciliation and commitment to democracy. Its press conference on 2 December 1989 turned out to be an opportunistic attempt to play up to the rebels and gain political points at a time of great peril for democracy. Vice President Laurel likewise fumbled his own opportunity for statesmanship while in Hong Kong at the time. There is, however, no reason, given the shifting tide of politics, why the opposition cannot recover from the widespread disapproval of the people of its behavior during the December 1989 coup attempt, f it is perceived to be unequivocal about its commitment to democratic processes.
The solidarity of the political leadership is a giant step in addressing the issue of a military that is isolated from the society it is supposed to protect. d. On the part of the Legislative Department and the President, the establishment of a special full-time commission to implement a post-insurgency program for the military that will modernize, professionalize, and bring it within the mainstream of national life.
Since the insurgency problem appears to be close to a solution, the government must design a post-insurgency program for the military, within the framework of the Constitution. The establishment of a Commission of respected civilian and military experts appointed by the President - with full powers and a budget to carry out its task - would deliver a strong message to the military that the government cares about their future, recognizes the existence of deep-seated and complex problems, and is determined to solve them. The program itself should evoke a resolve in the military to perform better in the field and thus hasten the victory over both the communist and Muslim insurgencies. A vital component of the program is its thorough modernization and the termination of its dependency on the US for its weaponry. Another component is a reformulation of the education system and training of officers. This would include a review of the program at the PMA and the establishment of other service academies. Although no direct correlation has been established between the PMA curriculum and the disposition of officers to engage in coups, testimonies of senior military officers call attention to the need to:
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by the Davide Commission
Chapter III of this report describes how the "rainbow coalition" of 1986 quickly unraveled because there was no organic unity in the first place, only a common goal of removing a dictator. Yet, the disunity is not necessarily an affliction of the grassroots. All the social surveys indicate a discernible consensus of the people on major issues, some of them considered as controversial, i.e., agrarian reform foreign debt, US military facilities, coup d’etat. Unfortunately, these are often obscured by the posturing of politicians and extremist groups, and the indecision of the Executive Department.
In view of the unsettled constitutional issue of her right to seek re-election in 1992 and the continuing speculation on her intent to run despite her past pronouncements to the contrary, an unambiguous declaration on her part would be timely and would be perceived as an act of statesmanship rather than a politician’s ploy.
The ruling coalition and the opposition must agree on a constructive relationship to save and strengthen democracy. Both must learn the distinction between political debate on the basis of issues and the exigencies of political maneuvering to take or keep power. The climate of distrust, extra-constitutional tendencies, and the politics of personalities must somehow be changed. In the case of Vice President Laurel, the government must decide either to file charges or carry out an initiative to provide him with a role befitting an official elected by the people to the second highest position of government.
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