f. Speedy action on appeals over decisions of AFP courts-martial.

This has already been mentioned in the Commission’s Interim Report No. 1. Related to this are the cases which are not being acted upon or are suffering undue delays. Actions on decisions on courts-martial which are subject to mandatory appellate review or which may eventually reach the President for confirmation should be speedily resolved.

g. The early passage of a comprehensive law on the establishment of the National Police.

Implementing the Constitutional provision would remove the anxiety and insecurity of those likely to be affected by the new law. Furthermore, the sooner such a law is enacted, the earlier could programs be implemented to separately strengthen the police and military organizations and resolve the confusion of overlapping jurisdictions.

h. The immediate implementation of a comprehensive program to provide timely rescue and medical assistance to troops wounded in combat.

The rebels have tried to claim credit for improving the benefits of soldiers. Unfortunately, the timing of such improvements (many have been instituted after coup attempts) have lent some credibility to these claims. The government is aware of the complaints about the inadequacy of medical and hospitalization benefits particularly of soldiers in combat. A comprehensive initiative of the government to help wounded soldiers would highlights its continuing concern, lift troop morale, and direct credit to where it belongs.

i. A review by the military of its decision to disband the Scout Ranger Regiment.

While Honasan and his group in some officers of the FSRR may have implanted the coup culture, it is not clear that it is permanently ingrained in the troops. It is also true that the military hierarchy may have unwittingly allowed it to happen and are, therefore, perceived to be arbitrary and unduly harsh. The FSRR may be one of the most effective units against the communist insurgency and should not end up being bitter and ineffective. Besides, attaching the Rangers to other units without first making sure they are rid of the coup "virus" would only facilitate the spread of the affliction. What makes the Rangers an elite unit, other than their training, is the spirit of oneness and collective pride. It is a spirit that must be harnessed rather than dispersed. The solution should be the assignment of officers who command the respect of the soldiers and who are themselves absolutely committed to democracy.

j. An immediate audit of the value formation program of the military and, with the help of civilian experts, the formulation of an intensive program (essentially constructive indoctrination), and the training of field commanders to carry it out.

The Commission received conflicting testimony on the effectiveness of the present program and noted that the military is reluctant to extensively use civilian expertise presumably in the belief that civilians cannot fully understand the military mind. The result, as played up also by newspaper reports, is a traditional, repetitive, and unimaginative approach such as that used with and ridiculed by some of the Scout Rangers. Thus, the results of the program in specific units are quite uneven, depending on the individual skill of its commander.

k. The immediate removal or reassignment of officers of less than 100 percent loyalty from sensitive positions in the military hierarchy, i.e., intelligence, operations, logistics, and training functions.

Consistent with the policy of not taking any risks as this time, and of forging a military with unquestioning loyalty to the Constitution, those with any taint of the coup should first be tested in less sensitive positions (assuming they do not retire early) before being given choice assignments.

l. The immediate disbandment of GCFI and all other organizations not authorized by the military.

Such organizations encourage factionalism and give opportunities for those with hidden agendas to exploit and manipulate them.

m. The observance of a systematic selection process for the new Chief of Staff that generates the least controversy about the choice.

The possibility of deep selection should not be foreclosed. An important criterion should be an impeccable record and reputation for non-partisanship, since the 1992 elections will be a critical test for democratic and peaceful change.

n. Just as in the civilian government, a crackdown by the military on some "big fish" corrupt officers.

There are apparently officers known within the military establishment to be corrupt and are perceived to be protected for personal or political reasons. The value of example cannot be underestimated to restore the confidence of those alienated by reason of their own knowledge or experience of corruption in the military. In particular, those in "syndicates" engaged in illegal gambling should be dealt with uncompromisingly.

o. An immediate stop to unfair and/or humiliating treatment and criticism of military officers by Congress and other public officials, especially those before the Commission on Appointments.

Political "grandstanding" is especially grating to the troops in the field, who feel that they are risking their lives for the wrong people.

p. Speedy and firm disciplinary action and/or prosecution against members of the military involved in human rights violations as well as of civilian law enforcement personnel involved in victimizing military personnel.

There should be no "sacred cows" when it comes to dispensation of justice.

q. The purchase or charter by Congress of its own transportation facilities and prohibition on their use of military equipment and aircraft.

Another common complaint of both rebel and government military officers is the use by members of Congress of military equipment, particularly aircraft, for their own purposes. On the one hand, such assets are perceived to be badly needed to support the troops in the field. On the other hand, the legitimate function of the legislature to appropriate funds, monitor the use of public money, and enact measures, would not be fully served if it did not have access to field observations and dialogues with such an important sector as the military. The Commission, therefore, suggests that Congress be allowed to purchase or charter a pool of transportation equipment, including airplanes, that can be utilized for official purposes, such as field inspections of military operations, provincial consultations, monitoring of the use of funds in emergency operations and calamities, and other similar purposes. In the long run, such arrangements will prove to be the most economical, efficient, and practical way of dealing with the issue.

r. The expansion of the government’s information program which has considerably and commendably improved since December 1989, with more participation by local government officials.

One of the most common complaints of the rebel soldiers is the absence of local officials particularly in insurgency areas. The local officials are the frontliners in the delivery of government services. They should be required to be in the field and their activities duly recorded for dissemination through the government'’ public information program. Systematizing the flow of information between the executive and local government officials should also prove useful for other purposes, i.e. calamities, rebel troop movements.

s. The provision of sufficient resources and support to the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military.

The filling up of this position is consistent with the findings of the Commission. He must be given the resources to do his job since the appointment has raised expectations within the military that their grievances will be heard. In organizing the staff of the office, care should be taken not to appoint those with "scores to settle" and worn-out ideas. It is time for young blood with fresh ideas, if the problems of the military are to be resolved.